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ABSTRACT 
Our bodily experiences can exert an influence on determining how we think, feel, and 
behave. This is because incidental bodily experiences affect how we understand and process 
abstract social concepts via the use of metaphors. According to this embodied perspective, bodily 
states or actions can cue metaphorically related social concepts and, in turn, influence our 
judgments in ways consistent with such physically experienced concepts. Drawing upon research 
on embodied cognition, in this dissertation I examine whether the way a choice is physically 
experienced can systemically influence how people respond to choice options. I manipulate 
bodily experiences at the point of choice by asking people to either draw positively connoted 
check-marks, or negatively connoted X-marks when making choices.  
Across five experiments, I find that different physical acts of choice can convey 
meanings of metaphorically associated concepts, leading people to make judgments consistent 
with such bodily experienced concepts. Specifically, compared to negatively connoted X-
marking behaviors, performing positively connoted check-marking actions leads people to 
evaluate both novel and familiar targets as more pleasant (studies 1 and 4), to agree more with 
statements about controversial social issues (studies 2 and 3), and to choose more target items 
(study 5). Overall, in this dissertation I confirm the metaphorically related physical and 
conceptual link and highlight the role of body-based metaphors in the processing of information. 
The way people physically respond to questions at the point of choice indeed affects their 
judgments and decisions. Theoretical and practical contributions and implications of these 
findings are discussed for further investigation. 
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All testify to the necessity of seeing mind-body as an integral whole. 
John Dewey (1928, p. 6) 
 
Man lives in a world of Meaning. 
George H. Mead (1926, p. 382)  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
How do people understand the world? How do people come to know about themselves, 
others, objects, and concepts? Are there any general rules or principles that elucidate the way 
people understand things? Social scientists, among others, have long been interested in such 
fundamental questions about the nature of understanding. They have focused on how people 
understand their external surroundings as well as their internal cognitive operations in order to 
achieve any form of knowledge. In other words, researchers have attempted to illuminate our 
understanding of the process of understanding per se.  
Before further discussion, consider the following example: Two men, Simon and Paul, 
both of whom get a regular medical check-up. Both feel that they are in good health. A few days 
after their respective checkups, they receive their own test results: Simon’s health report has a lot 
of check-marks, and Paul’s health report has a lot of X-marks, on the table of results. Do Simon 
and Paul respond differently to the results?  If so, who is more frustrated with the test results? 
Whose palms are sweatier? Perhaps people would assume that Paul, whose report was full of X-
marks, might be more discouraged by his test results than Simon.   
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Here is another example: Two women, Theresa and Lucy, go into the doctor’s office to 
receive a flu shot. Both have undergone a close medical examination recently, and they are in 
robust health. Before getting the flu shot, a doctor asks them to provide information about their 
physical conditions in different ways; both are given the same list of symptoms, but Theresa’s 
doctor asks her to complete the form using check-marks and Lucy’s doctor asks her to complete 
the form using X-marks. Will Theresa and Lucy, who are both in excellent health, report the 
same number of symptoms? If not, who is more likely to consider that the given symptoms are 
applicable to her?  
I shall attempt to provide an explanation of who might feel more symptoms listed in the 
patient information leaflet shortly; however, first I provide another brief digression into scholars’ 
understanding of human thought and decision making. Historically, researchers like B. F. 
Skinner argued that human mental processes such as perception and memory are not observable; 
they had emphasized the study of observable entities, which were human behaviors in physical 
environments (Miller, 2003; Schwartz, & Reisberg, 1991). This theoretical approach, known as 
behaviorism, however, could not succeed; researchers observed human behaviors first and then 
reasoned backwards from their observations to explore subjective mental processes that caused 
such behaviors (Schwartz, & Reisberg, 1991). After the cognitive revolution in the 1950s, 
researchers continued their efforts toward an understanding of information processing, by 
highlighting the function of the brain (Miller, 2003). Researchers have mainly focused on how 
the mind helps people process information and have provided evidence that human behaviors are 
based on thoughts derived from both cognitive and affective processing in the brain. 
Now consider the first example above again. The reason people chose Paul as the correct 
answer might be due to their brains’ cognitive processes; people might think that the way 
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something is depicted (i.e., a lot of X-marks) could make Paul discouraged. Yet, one question 
remains unanswered. How can a given social stimulus (i.e., an X-mark) shape our thoughts and 
feelings? Human understanding hinges on meaning interpretation (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). In 
an attempt to interpret meanings of subjective experiences, people routinely rely on metaphors, 
which allow them to understand their experiences with rich inferential structures or imagery 
(Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Ortony, 1993).  
Metaphors can provide important insight into how people think (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; 
Meier, Schnall, Schwarz, & Bargh, 2012). For example, people frequently use metaphors or 
metaphoric expressions in their everyday social world such as she is feeling down or I could see 
what he meant, though feeling sadness has nothing to do with the word denoting verticality (i.e., 
down) and understanding what another person intended to express is irrelevant to getting such 
information through our sense of vision (i.e., see). Literally, such metaphors and metaphoric 
expressions do not make sense. However, people have no trouble understanding the meanings of 
metaphor and metaphoric expressions and commonly use them in various contexts of thinking 
and understanding (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). In the first example described above, Paul might 
understand the situation metaphorically. Perceiving a lot of X-marks on the test results can 
involve an abstract social concept associated with X. Because the concept of X has a lot of bad 
connotations (e.g., dislikes, wrong, against, no), Paul’s thoughts, feelings, and behaviors might 
be guided by such metaphoric meanings associated with X.  
However, the body can also affect the processing of information (Gallagher, 2005), 
which seems counterintuitive and contradicts the direction of human understanding suggested 
above. For instance, people tended to evaluate cartoons as funnier when they held a pen with 
their teeth rather than their lips, because stimulating a certain facial muscle (i.e., zygomaticus 
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which is closely related to smiling) positively affected people’s evaluative judgments of cartoons 
(Strack, Martin, & Stepper, 1988). In addition, when people communicate with others, they 
commonly use their hands and make gestures as part of ongoing thought processes (McNeill, 
1992). If one’s hand is waved in the direction of another or oneself, such bodily actions can be 
closely linked to thoughts of avoidance or approach and, more importantly, can be interpreted as 
having a meaning of go-away or come-on, respectively.  
How do such bodily experiences figure into cognitive operations? Again, previous 
literature has highlighted the role of body-based metaphors in cognitive processes (Landau, 
Robinson, & Meier, 2014; Ortony, 1993; De Vega, Glenberg, & Graesser, 2008). When people 
encounter abstract social concepts, metaphors allow people to conceptualize them or reason 
about them by using more concrete concepts or experiences, which largely come from 
sensorimotor domains (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). In sum, human understanding is closely tied to 
bodily representations triggered by metaphorically related physical states or bodily actions 
(Landau et al., 2014). 
As is seen in the examples above, bodily states and actions can shape human cognition, 
and metaphors are determinants of such embodied effects. Metaphors prominently pervade 
mental processes, and people recruit metaphors to conceive of abstract targets or experiences in 
their social life (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). Now think about the aforementioned Theresa and 
Lucy example. I expect that Theresa, who responded with check-marks, might feel more 
symptoms listed in the patient information leaflet than Lucy. Why would this be the case? 
Performing the check-marking action can allow Theresa to physically experience an abstract 
social concept associated with a check-mark. Compared to X-marking, check-marking has a lot 
of good connotations such as right, likes, and for. Thus, the way something is physically 
5 
 
experienced (e.g., making certain marks repeatedly) could drive Theresa to think that she would 
have more symptoms than she actually has.  
Drawing upon research on embodied cognition and conceptual metaphor, this dissertation 
aims to test one important question: if bodily actions can cue metaphorically related social 
concepts and thus directly make people interpret such concepts, then is it possible to nudge 
people to behave in a predictable way? In this dissertation, I report five experiments designed to 
examine whether bodily experiences of marking while making choices affect how people make 
judgments and decisions. Performing certain marking actions such as drawing check-marks when 
making choices can be characterized as bodily manipulations of embodied cognition.  
Human cognitive processes are situated; they are responses to given contexts or situations 
(Clark, 1997; Wilson, 2002). Moreover, cognition is action oriented; it is supposed to guide 
behaviors in various social contexts (James, 1890; Meier et al., 2012; Wilson, 2002). 
Considering the aforementioned nature of cognition, embodied “cognition” through physical 
marking actions is also expected to be situated and action oriented. Therefore, like the Theresa 
example above, physical experiences of marking action might involve abstract social concepts 
such as the binaries of right and wrong (e.g., correct and incorrect, true and false), likes and 
dislikes (e.g., good and bad, positive and negative), and for and against (e.g., yes and no, agree 
and disagree) metaphorically. In this context, I postulate that physical experiences of marking 
action would, via metaphor, guide people’s subsequent judgments in various decision contexts 
(studies 1-5).  
I also attempt to clarify the embodied processes that cause bodily influences of marking 
actions. There is at least one similar route by which marking actions could influence behavior - 
all in the name of automaticity research (Bargh et al., 2012). The marks, themselves, could prime 
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people. Priming could activate certain concepts and influence behavior by increasing relevant 
concept accessibility (Bargh, 2006). Thus, I add another set of experimental conditions, which is 
an alternative instantiation of the marking action, stamping the check or X-marks; the potential 
explanation of conceptual priming is compared with embodied influences (study 3). 
In addition, to identify the situations or contexts that limit such embodied effects on 
judgments, I further test a possible boundary condition under which effects of embodied 
experiences are retained or eliminated. In study 5, I test whether question framing would interact 
with bodily experiences of marking and then influence subsequent judgment in predictable ways. 
I organize this dissertation as follows: I review two theoretical perspectives on human 
information processing – views of information processing for and against the inclusion of a 
bodily account. I first introduce the traditional cognitive approach that ignored bodily effects on 
cognitive processes (Barsalou, 2008; Krishina & Schwarz, 2014; Wyer, 1974), and then I discuss 
theories of embodied cognition as an emerging framework from the traditional cognitive 
approach (Barsalou, 2008; Landau, Meier, Keefer, 2010). Next, I attempt to explain the power of 
metaphor (Landau et al., 2014). I will explain how conceptual metaphors are not mere rhetorical 
devices but cognitive tools, which can shape our thoughts, feelings, and actions (Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1980; Sandford, 2003). Understanding the role of conceptual metaphor is the 
theoretical key to fully grasp the underlying process of how bodily experiences figure into 
cognitive processes (Meier et al., 2012). Subsequently, I provide empirical findings from 
previous literature and review how and why our thoughts are grounded in bodily experiences. 
After summing up the review, I point out a research gap and describe the objectives of the 
dissertation. Finally, I present five experiments that explore the effects of marking actions on 
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judgments and conclude the dissertation with a general discussion and theoretical implications of 
my findings. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The traditional schema perspective 
In what precise way does the mind understand something? After the cognitive revolution 
in the 1950s, researchers made progress on this fundamental question and provided important 
insights into the nature of human knowledge by developing models and theories of information 
processing (Semin, Garrido, & Palma, 2012; Wyer, 1974). These traditional models and theories 
of information processing assumed that human understanding could be captured through an 
analogy to machines. Many researchers conceived of human understanding as mechanical and 
computational (e.g., information acquisition – storage – retrieval, see Sandford, 2003); thus, they 
tended to treat information processing as an entirely cognitive or mental activity, while the 
effects of other bodily experiences, such as physical sensations and actions, on information 
processing were largely neglected. 
According to this traditional view, it was schemas – memory-based structures of abstract 
knowledge representation – that allowed people to understand the world around them (Barsalou, 
2008; Krishina, 2014; Landau et al., 2010; Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber, & 
Ric, 2005; Reimann et al., 2012). Researchers with this focus argued that people process 
information using their schemas to comprehend something, and those schemas were expected to 
function as building blocks for understanding the world (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Landau et al., 
2010; Niedenthal et al., 2005). 
Though the traditional schema approach advanced a scientific understanding of how 
people make sense of the world by providing a view about how the nature of human 
understanding could be analyzed, this view has a blind spot. The traditional schema approach 
9 
 
fails to fully reflect that the body is also tied to the processing of information. When explicating 
the mechanism through which sensory information is translated into the underlying schemas, this 
computational approach assumes that such cognitive processes proceed independently of the 
body (i.e., independent of the initial modalities that help information acquisition, Niedenthal et 
al., 2005). However, the body can be a source of knowledge and plays an important role in 
cognitive processes. 
Researchers have more recently begun to argue that the body is not simply there to carry 
the brain around, but rather it can also exert a strong influence on all kinds of cognition (Pfeifer 
& Bongard, 2007). They have examined an interaction between bodily experiences and 
information processing. For instance, people who held a cup of hot coffee were prone to form 
impressions of others as warm, yet people who held a cup of iced coffee were prone to judge 
others as cold (Williams & Bargh, 2008). This research clearly illustrated that irrelevant physical 
sensations of warmth and coldness affected how people formed impressions of others. In this 
context, researchers have proposed a new stance, namely embodied cognition, which is a theory 
that the body may play a fundamental role in shaping human cognition and, in turn, influence 
human judgments. If human understanding is indeed grounded in the body, this suggests that 
people’s physical experiences can shape their thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. 
 
The emerging perspective: Embodied cognition 
In recent years, researchers have proposed theories of grounded cognition and have 
started to emphasize the role of bodily experiences such as bodily states, actions, and simulations 
in human cognition (Barsalou, 2008). The core assumption of grounded cognition is that both 
actual bodily experiences and simulations of such bodily experiences in the brain’s modality-
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specific systems can cause cognitive states (Barsalou, 2008; 2010; Landau et al., 2010; 
Niedenthal et al., 2005; Reimann et al., 2012).  
The embodied view posits that cognitive representations and processes that are derived 
from physical interactions with environments are grounded in the modalities of perceptual 
experience or the body. In other words, bodily experiences or simulations in physical contexts 
underlie human cognition. Given the fact that human “cognition can be grounded in multiple 
ways such as bodily states, situated actions, and simulations” (Barsalou, 2008, p. 619), some 
researchers have attempted to understand human cognition by focusing more on the role of the 
body including bodily states and situated actions, whereas others have taken into account the role 
of mental simulation (Barsalou, 2008).  
It is important to note that those two primary foci of grounded cognition – (a) bodily 
states and actions, and (b) mental simulations – have led to different explanations of how bodily 
experiences figure into cognitive processes. The former account relies on cognitive linguistic 
theories, which posit that cognitive representations of abstract concepts are structured by bodily 
experiences in metaphoric ways. The Conceptual Metaphor Theory proposed that people 
routinely use metaphor to understand abstract concepts (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980); according to 
this theory people’s bodily states or bodily actions that metaphorically cue meanings of abstract 
concepts can also drive how people think, act, and decide. For example, physical sensations of 
weight affect how people think about the abstract concept of importance (Jostmann, Lakens, & 
Schubert, 2009). People who were asked to hold a heavy clipboard (1,039 grams) tended to judge 
various social issues (e.g., procedural justice) as more important than those who held a light 
clipboard (657 grams). Given that people often use weight as a metaphor for importance (e.g., 
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weighty negotiations), physically experienced bodily states encouraged individuals to think about 
relevant metaphoric concepts and, in turn, influenced how they judge the importance of issues. 
However, bodily experiences do not always exert this kind of grounded influence. 
Sometimes, mental imagery or mental simulation of such bodily experiences is enough to affect 
human cognition. Though embodied cognitions and mental simulations differ in their cognitive 
operations and sources, both similarly influence the way people think, feel, and behave. For 
example, simulating a specific experience in which individuals felt social exclusion elicits a 
feeling of coldness (Zhong & Leonardelli, 2008). Individuals who were asked to recall a social 
exclusion experience tended to estimate the room temperature as lower than those who recalled a 
social inclusion experience. Other research also demonstrated that simulated actions can cause 
behavioral responses that are expected from actual actions (Morewedge, Huh, & Vosgerau, 
2010). For example, people who repeatedly imagined consuming a food many times (e.g., 30 
M&Ms) were less likely to eat such food compared to those who imagined consuming the same 
food fewer times (e.g., 3 M&Ms). 
Thus, the latter account of grounded cognition, mental simulation, can shape our thoughts, 
feelings, and behaviors. Here, mental simulation is “the reenactment of perceptual, motor, and 
introspective states acquired during experience with the world, body, and mind” (Barsalou, 2008, 
p. 618). How do people possibly come to understand something through this mental simulation 
mechanism? According to previous literature on cognitive simulation theories, human cognition 
depends on the brain’s modality-specific systems, which process information derived from 
bodily experiences and simulations, for perception, action, and introspection (Barsalou, 1999; 
2008; Damasio, 1994). Facilitating mental simulations of experience (e.g., perception or action) 
leads to neural activations through the brain’s modality-specific systems; thus, certain 
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experiences can be reenacted by merely simulating perceptual states or actions without the 
original state or action being experienced (Barsalou, 1999; 2008; Niedenthal et al., 2005).  
Taken together, grounded cognition highlighted the roles of the body and mental 
simulation in human cognition
1
. Though this perspective, grounded (or embodied) cognition, 
enables researchers to reconsider human cognition with regard to physical interactions with the 
world, an important question still remains as to how embodied experiences figure into cognitive 
operations or conceptual systems. People experience the world with their senses and make sense 
of a given stimulus by using their knowledge about relevant or similar stimuli. However, after 
observing what people do to capture abstract concepts, researchers found that people are prone to 
experience and understand abstract concepts by utilizing metaphor (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980).  
I argue that metaphor functions as the bridge between human understanding and 
embodied experiences because both bodily experiences and simulations could affect people’s 
judgments and behaviors in a metaphoric manner. Consider the aforementioned studies: people 
typically use weight as a linguistic metaphor for importance (e.g., his opinion is certain to carry 
weight). However, people can also interpret the metaphoric relation between weight and 
importance on a conceptual level; as evidence, bodily states (e.g., holding a heavy clipboard) 
make people think about abstract concepts (e.g., importance) and influence their evaluative 
judgments (e.g., evaluating issues). In addition, people routinely use physical warmth or coldness 
as a linguistic metaphor for interpersonal closeness. The metaphoric relation between physical 
and interpersonal warmth (coldness) is also observed in a conceptual domain; people who 
                                                          
1
 Though both direct bodily experiences (bodily states and actions) and mentally simulated 
experiences can drive human cognition, the research scope in this dissertation is limited to 
investigating whether the direct body-based experience causes our cognitive representations. 
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recalled a situation in which they felt social exclusion rated the room temperature as cold, while 
those who were asked to recall a social inclusion experience rated the room temperature as warm. 
Mental simulations (e.g., recalling a social exclusion experience) cause people to make sense of 
abstract concepts (e.g., social distance or loneliness conceptualized as coldness) and 
subsequently drive their responses (e.g., reporting lower estimates of the temperature).  
In sum, metaphor functions as a cognitive mechanism that guides our thoughts, feelings, 
and behaviors, and it plays an important role in determining embodied influences. Thus, in the 
following section I provide detailed information about the power of metaphor largely based on 
the Conceptual Metaphor Theory
2
.  
 
The power of metaphor 
Metaphor is commonly defined as “a figure of speech through which we describe one 
thing in terms of another” (Landau et al., 2014, p. 4). Metaphor plays an important role in 
helping people understand and communicate abstract concepts in terms of dissimilar (or even 
literally unrelated) concepts that are relatively easier to grasp (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). How 
can metaphors affect thought?  
People are prone to simplify difficult cognitive processes with the help of linguistic 
metaphor, substituting an easier concept for a more difficult one (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). 
                                                          
2
 Different theories (e.g., modal architecture, cognitive linguistic theories, cognitive simulation 
models, Barsalou, 2008; Niedenthal et al., 2005) have provided explanations of how human 
cognition can be shaped by bodily experiences. Although these theories differ substantively, they 
all tend to make similar predictions – physical experiences can have a strong impact on the way 
people think and make judgments. 
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Perhaps it is difficult for people to come to understand an abstract domain such as the concept of 
intimacy or social closeness; however, it is relatively easy to comprehend or directly experience 
a concrete domain like physical warmth in terms of a bodily temperature. In this context, a 
metaphoric mapping to the abstract concept (e.g., intimacy) from a distinctively dissimilar 
concept (e.g., warmth) helps people to understand the meaning of the abstract concept. People 
commonly use metaphoric expressions or idioms such as she is warmhearted or a warm greeting 
(Landau et al., 2014). As Williams and Bargh (2008) have shown, incidental bodily experiences 
that involve metaphorically related concepts of interpersonal warmth can also shape how people 
think and behave; holding a warm cup of coffee rather than a cold cup of coffee makes people 
evaluate others’ impressions or personalities as warmer and also makes people behave in a warm 
manner (e.g., choosing a gift for others). Thus, the underlying processes of the effects of 
embodied cognition could be identified by theoretical and empirical examination of the role of 
metaphor (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Landau et al., 2010; Meier et al., 2012). 
According to the Conceptual Metaphor Theory, metaphors enable people to use 
conceptual mappings between abstract target concepts and concrete source concepts (Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1980). Here, the conceptual mapping refers to “a systematic set of associations between 
elements of a target and analogous elements of the source” (Landau et al., 2014, p. 6). Since 
conceptual mappings involve metaphorically related sets of mental associations or multimodal 
representations between corresponding elements of the concepts, metaphors make people draw 
on their knowledge about concrete source domains as a reference for understanding abstract or 
even complex target domains (Barsalou, 2008; Landau et al., 2010; Landau et al., 2014; 
Williams, Huang, & Bargh, 2009). In other words, when people attempt to clarify abstract 
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concepts on the basis of their knowledge, metaphors operate as machines for generating 
conceptual mappings between source concepts and target concepts.  
Then, in what ways do embodied experiences translate into metaphors that underlie the 
ways people think about something? Previous literature has demonstrated that when bodily states 
or actions are metaphorically related to concepts of target, such bodily experiences could 
profoundly influence how people make judgments about the target. For instance, previous 
research focusing on a “bodily state” as an embodied mechanism3 has suggested that: (1) merely 
holding a hot cup of coffee leads individuals to form impressions of others as warm, because 
bodily sensations of physical warmth activate metaphorically related concepts of interpersonal 
warmth or intimacy (William & Bargh, 2011); (2) holding a heavy clipboard causes individuals 
to evaluate various social issues as important, because physical sensations of weight trigger 
metaphorically linked concepts of importance (Jostmann et al., 2009); (3) smelling something 
fishy encourages individuals to be unwilling to cooperate in a trust-based game, because bodily 
experiences of fishy smells induce feelings of suspicion in a metaphoric manner (Lee & Schwarz, 
2014); (4) smelling clean scents stemming from Windex guides individuals to be more willing to 
donate money to a charitable organization, because such sensory experiences elicit 
metaphorically related concepts of morality or cleanliness (Liljenquist, Zhong, & Galinsky, 
2010); (5) sitting in a hard chair that elicits metaphorically associated concepts of rigidity or 
strictness makes individuals less agreeable, producing less change in a negotiation task 
(Ackerman, Nocera, & Bargh, 2010).  
                                                          
3
 A bodily state here refers to physical experience through the five senses or “an unmoving state 
of the body” (Krishna, 2012, p. 344). 
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Furthermore, previous research centering on a “bodily action” (or situated action) as a 
body-based mechanism
4
 has also suggested that: (1) firming muscles (e.g., grasping a pen in 
one’s fist) improves self-regulation and makes people choose healthier foods, because such 
bodily actions facilitate metaphorically related thoughts of willpower (Hung & Labroo, 2011); (2) 
washing hands decreases subjective feelings of guilt, because such bodily actions are related to 
concepts of purity in a metaphoric manner (Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006); (3) merely using a touch 
interface (e.g., touching iPad) for online shopping generates a strong endowment effect, because 
bodily experiences with touch screens elicit metaphorically related thoughts of ownership 
(Brasel & Gips, 2014); (4) making and holding expansive body postures with open limbs leads 
individuals to make a risky choice because such physical actions mentally activate abstract 
concepts of power (Carney, Cuddy, & Yap, 2010); (5) nodding one’s head makes individuals 
more willing to agree with a persuasive message because such vertical head movements 
metaphorically imply concepts of yes or validity (Wells & Petty, 1980). All these findings 
illustrate that physical experiences, bodily states and actions, are inextricably tied to the 
metaphoric processing of information. Metaphoric mappings between abstract social concepts 
and concrete concepts derived from embodied experiences shape our understanding, and thus, 
concrete embodied experiences indeed function as cognitive instruments.  
The role of metaphor in embodied cognition is also supported by evolutionary 
perspectives. Researchers with an evolutionary adaption focus proposed the scaffolding theory, 
which suggests that, “early sensorimotor experiences serve as the foundation for the later 
                                                          
4
 A situated action is defined as “a physical movement that is not locomotive in nature” (Krishna, 
2012, p. 344).  
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development of more abstract concepts and goals” (Williams et al., 2009, p. 1287). Like physical 
supporting structures in building construction, people’s early experiences of physical 
environments structure their later conceptual knowledge of more abstract concepts. For example, 
think about how infants come to learn or to know about something. They first begin with basic 
concepts (e.g., likes), which can be entirely captured through their direct bodily experiences (e.g., 
touching, grasping). Other related concepts (e.g., dislike) or more abstract concepts (e.g., close 
relationships like marriage) could be built up from such basic concepts derived from directly 
experienced aspects of the world. Thus, directly experienced concepts and accompanying 
metaphorically related actions in early childhood help people understand abstract concepts later 
in life. Such abstract concepts can be scaffolded onto existing concepts for producing novel 
concepts (Bargh, Schwader, Hailey, Dyer, & Boothby, 2012; Bergen & Feldman, 2008; Mandler, 
1992; Williams et al., 2009). Understandings of the physical environment in early childhood are 
likely to serve as supporting building structures for the development of more abstract concepts 
later; and more importantly, such understandings derived from direct experiences lead to the 
basis for conceptual metaphors as well as conceptual mappings between metaphors and 
experiences (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Landau et al., 2010; Williams e al., 2009). 
 
In search of a research gap: Research objectives 
Human cognition is grounded within the body (Barsalou, 2010; Kahneman, 2011). 
However, previous works have not yet demonstrated any effects of embodied experiences at the 
point of choice; only a few empirical studies attempted to illuminate effects of bodily 
experiences at the point of choice on our judgments and decisions. For instance, Wells and Petty 
(1980) and Briñol and Petty (2003) conducted experiments in which they asked participants to 
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nod or shake their heads while listening to a message. All participants were asked to give their 
own opinions about the message. The results suggested that participants who were instructed to 
nod their heads (vs. shake their heads) tended to agree more with a given message. By proposing 
a self-validation hypothesis, they explicated that those vertical head movements (i.e., nodding) 
increase participants’ subjective confidence in their thoughts, while horizontal head movements 
(i.e., shaking) decrease participants’ confidence in their thoughts. In a similar vein, Cacioppo, 
Priester, and Berntson (1993) carried out experiments in which their participants were asked to 
perform one of two situated actions before making actual judgments: one was arm flexion that 
would be expected to be linked to abstract concepts of acquisition or approach, and another was 
arm extension that would be expected to be coupled with concepts of withdrawal or avoidance. 
They examined whether such situated actions would affect participants’ judgments. In the arm 
flexion condition, they instructed participants to place their hands on the bottom of the desk and 
lift the desk by using their arms. The arm extension condition was manipulated by instructing 
participants to place their hands on the top of the desk and to press down on it with their hands. 
Participants were exposed to Chinese pictographs when they engaged in either flexion or 
extension actions, and then were asked to indicate their preferences toward the pictographs. 
Participants tended to rate Chinese pictographs presented during arm flexion (vs. arm extension) 
as more pleasant.  
Though those studies yielded promising findings that incidentally experienced bodily 
actions shape people’s thoughts and subsequent judgments, such manipulated bodily actions 
were performed before people made their actual judgments about unrelated targets rather than at 
the point of choice. Moreover, those previous studies manipulated bodily experiences through 
overt head movements (e.g., nodding or shaking one’s head) and hand movements (e.g., pressing 
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or lifting the desk with one’s hands), which almost certainly would not happen in a natural 
choice situation. Based on theories of embodied cognition and the conceptual metaphor theory, I 
carry out five experiments to explore whether bodily experiences at the point of choice affect 
people’s judgments and decisions. I specifically propose a subtle but natural action at the point of 
choice that is a marking action. I assume that this physical action can alter people’s decision 
contexts as well as make people think and behave in ways that are consistent with the metaphoric 
meanings of the actions. Therefore, differential marking actions that metaphorically denote 
abstract social concepts, such as the binaries of right and wrong (e.g., correct and incorrect, true 
and false), likes and dislikes (e.g., good and bad, positive and negative), and for and against (e.g., 
yes and no, agree and disagree) are expected to reliably guide people’s thoughts and judgments. I 
thus argue that performing certain marking actions such as drawing check-marks or X-marks 
when making choices can function as bodily manipulations of embodied cognition and, in turn, 
affects our thoughts and judgments.  
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3. DISSERTATION STUDY ONE: PILOT STUDY WITH NEUTRAL STIMULI 
 
Introduction 
Study 1 was a pilot study examining the effects of bodily experiences at the point of 
choice that convey metaphorical meanings on human judgment and decision-making. The 
primary goal of this pilot study was to find preliminary evidence that the way a choice is 
physically experienced could systemically influence how people actually respond to choice 
options. In particular, I attempted to establish a link between bodily experiences at the point of 
choice, marking actions, and decision outcomes consisting of pleasant or unpleasant judgments.  
I first manipulated bodily experiences at the point of choice with either a presumably 
positively valenced check marking action or a negatively valenced X marking action. Adopting 
novel pictographs and neutral images as experimental stimuli (Payne, Brown-Iannuzzi, & Panter, 
2014; Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005; Payne, & Lundberg, 2014), I tested the 
hypothesis that a positively valenced marking action at the point of choice would cause people to 
evaluate neutral stimuli as more pleasant, whereas a negatively valenced marking action would 
lead people to rate the same neutral stimuli as less pleasant. I predicted that certain acts of 
marking (e.g., drawing a check-mark symbol) would influence people’s evaluation for novel 
targets; however, it could also be possible that the hypothesized effect may arise from other 
psychological experiences such as thought confidence or perceived motor fluency.  
For instance, previous research addressed that people tend to use external cues like other 
people’s opinions to validate their thoughts; such external cues to validity play a critical role in 
enhancing or undermining people’s thought confidence, which in turn influences their attitudes 
(Briñol  & Petty, 2003). In the present study, participants might make evaluative judgments by 
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using direct visual cues derived from the two manipulated marking actions (i.e., check marks). 
For instance, participants who were asked to draw relatively positive check-marks on their 
answers (vs. relatively negatively X-marks) might feel confident in their answers (or choices) 
because such external visual cues could guide them to positively validate their thoughts. More 
importantly, such improved confidence might elicit favorable thoughts toward novel 
experimental stimuli (Briñol & Petty, 2003) or might lead participants to actively engage in 
information processing (Wan, & Rucker, 2013).  Therefore, participants’ subjective confidence 
in their answers was measured to rule out an alternative possibility of any positive (or negative) 
effect derived from increased (or decreased) confidence in responses.  
In addition, there is a possibility that one of the two seemingly similar hand movements, 
either drawing check or X, might be easier to do (i.e., might be done more fluently) and then 
impact participants’ feelings of ease. Both marks require two strokes, but a check-mark does not 
require one to lift the pen from the paper, so check-marks might be easier to write than X-marks. 
Previous studies have demonstrated that more fluent sensorimotor actions cause people to have 
more positive thoughts, feelings, and evaluations (Oppenheimer, 2008). Thus, the subjective 
experience of motor fluency derived from a given marking action here might lead participants to 
make their evaluative judgment (i.e., pleasant or unpleasant judgment) based on an irrelevant 
feature of the experimental manipulation, physical difficulty of the marking action. If making 
check-marks is a more fluent motion than making X-marks, people may enjoy the former task 
more than the latter, and therefore rate stimuli more favorably when making check-marks. Given 
that any experiences of fluency are affectively positive, I decided to control for the influence of 
motor fluency that could be experienced by the two bodily manipulations of choice (e.g., 
drawing check vs. X). Thus, in order to rule out those alternative explanations, I further 
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examined differences in subjective confidence in choice and motor fluency between the 
experimental conditions. 
 
Method 
Participants 
Seventy-eight undergraduate students from a public Midwestern university, 27 males and 
51 females (Mage = 19.56, SDage = 1.45), participated in the study in exchange for extra course 
credit. Participants were 50 US citizens and 28 international students, and they were randomly 
assigned into one of two experimental conditions, a drawing check condition or a drawing X 
condition. Participants took part in the experiment in groups of two to eight, but they were 
randomly assigned to experimental conditions individually, not in groups. These two conditions 
differed only in the marking behavior that participants were asked to do in response to all 
questionnaire items and the novel stimuli. 
 
Procedure 
When participants arrived at the laboratory, they were asked to sign a consent form first. 
Participants were then seated at rectangular desks that were separated by dark-colored partitions, 
which prevented them from seeing others’ responses to the experimental materials. Afterward, 
participants were informed that the study aimed to explore whether a relationship exists among 
their personality traits, media and technology usage, and evaluative judgments of novel stimuli. 
The experimenter told the participants that they would engage in a paper-and-pencil study. All 
participants were instructed, via printed instructions that they need to accurately answer the 
questionnaire items. More importantly, they were informed that the experimenter would input all 
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responses manually for statistical analysis and thus they were required to draw a specific mark as 
large as possible over (or next to) the answer. The instruction to draw large marks was intended 
to corroborate participants’ bodily experiences at the point of choice. For example, participants 
in the check-mark condition were required to draw check on their answers, where participants in 
the x-mark condition were required to draw X on their answers. This cover story disguised the 
fact that what the experimenter actually manipulated was whether the participants were engaging 
in one of the two different marking actions, either a check-marking or a x-marking action. No 
participants were suspicious of the experimental manipulations and hypothesis. 
 
Measures 
First, all participants were instructed to complete two sets of questionnaire items: one set 
of items that reflected five dimensions of personality traits and a second set to measure media 
and technology usage. The five dimensions of personality (i.e., Openness, Conscientiousness, 
Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism) were represented by 15 statements (e.g., I don't 
mind being the center of attention), three from each of the five dimensions. Participants 
responded using five-point Likert-type scales (1 = Strongly disagree, 5 = Strongly agree). Here, 
all 15 items were randomly selected from the 60-item NEO Five Factor Inventory (Costa & 
McCrae, 1992) by using the RAND function from Microsoft Excel.  
Media and technology usage was measured by seventeen items randomly selected from 
the Media and Technology Usage and Attitude Scale (Rosen, Whaling, Carrier, Cheever, & 
Rokkum, 2013). To be specific, attitudes toward media (e.g., I feel it is important to be able to 
access the Internet any time I want) were captured by seven items with response options on five-
point Likert-type scales (1 = Strongly disagree, 5 = Strongly agree); media use (e.g., Check your 
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Facebook page or other social networks) was assessed by eight items with response options on 
five-point scales (1 = Never, 5 = Several times an hour). However, the two sets of items above 
were filler items, leading participants to practice their randomly assigned styles of marking 
before they would be exposed to novel and neutral visual stimuli.  
I used two sets of affectively neutral stimuli to control for any unwanted influences of 
participants’ pre-existing preference, affect, and arousal regarding evaluative judgment. In line 
with this effort, participants’ subjective confidence in their own answers and perceived difficulty 
of the marking action were assessed to ensure that the results of study 1 were solely due to 
manipulated ways of marking (e.g., drawing check marks on answers) rather than to other 
psychological experiences. 
To be specific, participants were asked to rate their confidence in answers on scales 
ranging from 1, Not confident at all, to 7, Extremely confident; 1, Not certain at all, to 7, 
Extremely certain; 1, Not valid at all, to 7, Extremely valid (M = 5.77, SD = .87, Cronbach’s 
alpha = .77). Participants were also asked to rate the difficulty of the marking action through a 
single, 7-point response item (M = 2.32, SD = 1.57) anchored at 1 (Not difficult at all) and 7 
(Very difficult).    
 
Independent variable 
In designing the studies, which demonstrate that bodily experiences at the point of choice 
can exert an influence on determining our thoughts and feelings, it was critical to find 
preliminary evidence suggesting that physical activities or bodily experiences cause differential 
judgments. The two different types of sensorimotor experience were manipulated through two 
ways of marking action performed by participants. Given that the cognitive linguistic model 
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(Lakoff & Johnson, 1980) suggests that people experience abstract concepts using metaphors or 
metaphorically related behaviors, participants were expected to form more favorable attitudes 
towards unfamiliar stimuli after they had performed a type of positive marking action (drawing 
check) than a type of negative marking behavior (drawing X). 
 
Dependent variable 
After finishing the two sets of filler items, participants were asked to evaluate the visual 
pleasantness of 20 neutral stimuli; 10 Chinese pictographs and 10 fractal images (see Figure 1). 
These two types of images were expected to serve as affectively neutral stimuli (Payne et al., 
2005), which helped me rule out any possibilities that people's prior preference or attitude toward 
experimental materials might influence bodily manipulations of choice and subsequent 
evaluative judgment. All participants were exposed to the same Chinese pictographs and fractal 
images in the two conditions that were distinguished only by the marking action. To eliminate 
any ordering effect (e.g., recency or primacy effect), I used four differently-ordered versions of 
the same questionnaire and all Chinese pictographs and fractal images were mixed up.   
Specifically, participants were first exposed to ten random-ordered Chinese pictographs 
and ten random-ordered fractal images and then were asked to evaluate the visual pleasantness of 
each stimulus by drawing the same mark they used previously for answering. They were 
explicitly informed that there were no right or wrong answers and what they needed to do was 
truthfully evaluate all experimental stimuli with a six-point scale (1 = Extremely unpleasant, 6 = 
Extremely pleasant) based on their gut reaction. 
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Figure 1. Examples of experimental stimuli 
 
Results 
I examined whether bodily experiences at the point of choice through the two distinctive 
marking actions influenced evaluative judgment on the two types of novel stimuli. A 2 (types of 
marking actions: check vs. X) x 2 (types of stimuli: Chinese pictograph vs. fractal image) mixed-
model analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed. The ANOVA yielded a significant main 
effect of marking actions, F (1, 76) = 10.95, p < .01, η2 = .07, but no significant interaction, F < 
1, p = ns. This finding indicated that there existed a significant effect of marking actions on 
participants’ evaluative judgments regardless of the types of novel stimuli. Participants who were 
asked to draw the check-marks on answers (M = 3.75, SD = .51) tended to rate neutral visual 
stimuli as more favorable than those who drew the X-marks (M = 3.32, SD = .63). 
To confirm how evaluative judgments (i.e., pleasant- or unpleasant judgments) were 
affected by the physical experiences of choice, I decided to carry out additional separate analyses 
on the two marking actions. First, I conducted two-tailed independent samples t tests to compare 
participants’ evaluative judgment in the check-mark condition with their evaluative judgment in 
the x-mark condition. Participants in the check-mark condition (M = 4.04, SD = .78) rated the 10 
randomized Chinese pictographs more pleasant than those in the x-mark condition (M = 3.50, SD 
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= 1.01), t (77) = -2.66, p < .01, 95% confidence interval (CI) for the difference between the two 
conditions = [.36, .92], Cohen’s d = .60 (see Figure 2).  
 
 
Figure 2. Evaluative judgment of novel stimuli (10 Chinese pictographs) by type of marking  
(All error bars indicate standard errors, representing precision of the resulting estimates) 
 
Participants in the check-mark condition (M = 3.45, SD = .62) also evaluated the 10 
random-ordered fractal images more favorably than those in the x-mark condition (M = 3.13, SD 
= .60), t (77) = -2.33, p < .05, 95% confidence interval (CI) for the difference between the two 
conditions = [.35, .72], Cohen’s d = .53 (see Figure 3).  
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Figure 3. Evaluative judgment of novel stimuli (10 fractal images) by type of marking  
(All error bars indicate standard errors, representing precision of the resulting estimates) 
 
In addition, there were no significant differences across the two conditions in terms of 
either participants’ confidence in answers (t (77) = -.26, p = ns) or perceived difficulty of the 
marking action (t (77) = -1.23, p = ns). The first result suggested that the current results were not 
confounded by any positive or negative influences of feelings of confidence, indicating that 
visual cues from the experimental manipulations (e.g., check marks) did not support or 
undermine participants’ subjective confidence and their subsequent evaluative judgments. The 
latter result addressed that perceived difficulty of the two marking actions also did not differ 
between experimental conditions, suggesting that any difference in motor fluency did not 
influence judgments. Thus, I concluded that all participants engaged in evaluative processing in a 
similar manner. 
In addition, though many significant human experiences are universal, the connotative 
meanings of marks (or symbols) might vary across cultures (Carey, 1989; Lakoff & Johnson, 
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1980; Osgood, 1975). Since marks (or symbols) are products of social interaction in a given 
cultural society, culture might constitute the way of construing a certain mark. To ensure that 
there was no cultural influence (US vs. non-US citizens), a 2 (types of marking actions: check vs. 
X) x 2 (cultural backgrounds: US citizen vs. non US citizen) mixed-model analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) was conducted on evaluative judgment of the neutral visual stimuli. This analysis 
revealed no significant main effect of cultural backgrounds, F (1, 76) = 2.71, p = ns, and no 
significant interaction, F (1, 76) = 2.15, p = ns. This finding indicated that evaluative judgments 
after performing the two different types of marking action did not differ as a function of cultural 
background (US citizens, n= 50, M = 3.62, SD = .48 vs. non US citizens, n = 28, M = 3.38, SD 
= .78). 
 
Discussion 
The results of study 1 provided initial support for embodied effects of marking action on 
evaluative judgment. As hypothesized, evaluative judgment on the same novel visual stimuli 
hinged on bodily experiences at the point of choice; participants who performed positively 
connoted check marking actions tended to evaluate novel stimuli as more favorable, while 
participants who performed negatively connoted X marking actions tended to rate the same 
stimuli as less favorable. I speculate that physical acts of marking at the point of choice guided 
participants’ subsequent judgments in a metaphoric manner. To elaborate, bodily experiences at 
the point of choice through both check and X marking actions were expected to be 
metaphorically associated with abstract social concepts such as the binaries of yes and no, 
pleasant and unpleasant, positive and negative, correct and incorrect, and agree and disagree, 
respectively. The results confirmed that such metaphoric associations between abstract social 
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concepts and bodily acts of marking led participants to evaluate the same affectively neutral 
stimuli as more or less favorable, respectively. 
In addition, in study 1 I attempted to limit any unwanted influence derived from 
subjective confidence in answers. The findings revealed that bodily manipulations of choice here 
had no effect on participants’ confidence in their answers, which suggested that the self-
validation effects did not occur through bodily experiences of check-marking or X-marking. 
Previous research found that people who were instructed to nod their heads (i.e., vertical head-
movements) were more prone to agree with a persuasive message than those who were asked to 
shake their heads (i.e., horizontal head-movements). Briñol and Petty (2003) argued that those 
two distinct head-movements facilitate positive or negative thoughts because such head-
movements could be misattributed as cues of validity, leading people to feel more or less 
confident in their thoughts. However, such self-validation effects were not observed in the 
present study; participants who drew positively connoted check-marks (vs. negatively connoted 
X-marks) did not exhibit a higher confidence in their answers, so confidence is not a plausible 
explanation for the findings in study 1. 
Because participants were engaged in different marking actions, one might assume that 
they could feel different levels of task difficulty. Considering that perceived motor fluency 
derived from a given marking action could affect subsequent judgments, I controlled for any 
influence of motor fluency that could be experienced by the two bodily manipulations of choice. 
The findings revealed that bodily manipulations of choice again had no effect on participants’ 
perceived task difficulty; perceived task difficulty stemming from check-marking and X-marking 
actions did not differ, so task difficulty is not a plausible explanation for the findings in study 1. 
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Lastly, this study examined whether participants who were U.S. citizens or non U.S. 
citizens tended to rate novel neutral stimuli as more pleasant after they performed a check-
marking action rather than a X-marking action. The results showed that both U.S. citizens and 
non U.S. citizens interpreted the meaning of the marks similarly.  
Though the current findings provided preliminary evidence that given marking actions 
significantly influenced participants’ subsequent judgments, it should be further tested whether 
bodily manipulations of marking action would cue metaphorically related abstract concepts. In 
study 1 there is no direct evidence of this. Moreover, it would be meaningful if I could replicate 
the current findings in a different decision making situation above and beyond evaluative 
judgment of novel visual stimuli. To further demonstrate the potential impacts of physically 
experienced marking actions, study 2 included a control group (i.e., drawing neutral O-marks on 
answers) as well as a set of manipulation check items. A neutral control group allows a better 
understanding of whether check-marks and X-marks move people in opposite directions, or 
whether only one type of mark is affecting participants (e.g., the X-mark has no effect, but the 
check-mark makes people respond more favorably). 
In study 2, I will provide an initial test of the hypothesis – that physical experiences of 
marking action would drive how people make judgments about familiar targets. Study 2 used 
controversial social policies and issues as targets to be evaluated. One could assume that if 
people already formed their own beliefs toward such social policies and issues, they might be 
cognitively biased by their pre-existing beliefs and thus would not be dramatically influenced by 
physically experienced marking actions. However, if I could replicate and extend the current 
findings in a more challenging decision making context described above, I can provide: 1) clear 
and direct evidence for the relationship between the abstract social concepts of check and X (i.e., 
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aforementioned binaries such as yeas and no, agree and disagree, or positive and negative) and 
metaphoric marking actions (i.e., check and X-marking), and 2) some support for the hypothesis 
that bodily acts of marking at the point of choice guide the way in which people respond to not 
only neutral targets but also familiar targets, leading them to make judgments more consistent 
with metaphoric meanings of given marking actions. 
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4. DISSERTATION STUDY TWO: REPLICATING STUDY ONE WITH A CONTROL 
CONDITION 
 
Introduction 
The objectives of study 2 were two-fold. The first goal was to replicate the previous 
empirical findings in a true experimental setting with a control group. A secondary goal was to 
tackle a more provocative research problem. People’s judgments about targets could be guided 
not only by the way in which they respond to targets but also their pre-existing beliefs toward 
targets. If people already have pre-existing beliefs about targets, do bodily experiences at the 
point of choice sway their responses to such targets? In other words, can certain acts of marking 
influence their likelihood of acceptance (or rejection) of targets?  
To answer this question, I hypothesized that bodily experiences at the point of choice 
with either a positively connoted check-marking action or a negatively connoted X-marking 
action would influence people’s beliefs about targets, encouraging them to rate such targets as 
more or less likable. Particularly, assuming that people have at least some opinions on given 
social policies and issues, I examined whether bodily experiences at the point of choice increase 
or decrease their level of agreement with such controversial social policies and issues. The 
design of study 2 was the same as that of study 1, except for the inclusion of an additional 
control condition. There were manipulation check items for confirming the meanings of check 
and X-marks.  
Previous studies have asserted that the body is reliably associated with the processing of 
information (Barsalou, 1999, 2008; Landau et al., 2010; Niedenthal et al., 2005; Reimann et al., 
2012). As noted above, researchers assume that modally grounded cognitive processes can be 
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driven by two similar but distinctive bodily experiences: bodily state and action (Barsalou, 2008); 
both bodily states and bodily actions lead people to make sense of such abstract targets in 
metaphoric ways (Barsalou, 2008; Clark, 1997; Landau et al., 2010; Wilson, 2002). Empirical 
findings also have echoed that incidental bodily experiences significantly affect the way people 
think, feel, and behave (Liljenquist et al., 2010; Meier et al., 2012; Topolinski, Lindner, & 
Freudenberg, 2014; Williams & Bargh, 2008; Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006).  
Given that bodily experiences can cue metaphorically related meanings and convey 
modality-specific representations about concepts (Lee & Schwarz, 2012), I assumed that 
physical experiences of choice through marking actions could also be able to influence the 
degree to which people agree with social issues. Thus, I predicted that a positively valenced 
check-marking action (compared to a negatively valenced X-marking action or a neutral O-
marking action) would cause people to act in a more favorable manner, leading them to evaluate 
divisive social issues as more agreeable.  
To be specific, I argued that if people thought certain marks have a positive or a negative 
meaning, it would be likely that people drawing such marks feel a positive or negative bodily 
experience accordingly. Because human cognition is situated and action-oriented by nature 
(Wilson, 2002), thought and action should not be separated but should be closely coupled. 
Therefore, in study 2, I expect to observe differences in people’s beliefs about three marks where 
the check-mark, the X-mark, and the O-mark represent a positive, a negative, and a neutral 
concept, respectively. If true, this result would also imply that merely making marks could 
encourage people to behave in ways that are consistent with the meanings of marks. 
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Method 
Participants 
In exchange for course credit, 92 participants (23 males, 69 females) between the ages of 
19 and 25 years (Mage = 21.05, SDage = 1.08) took part in this experiment. They were 
undergraduate students from a public Midwestern university (77 US citizens and 15 international 
students). 
 
Procedure  
All procedures were similar to those used in study 1. The participants arrived at the 
laboratory and were asked to sign a consent form first; as a cover story, they were told that they 
would be taking part in a simple paper-and-pencil study that aimed to examine whether a 
relationship exists among personality traits, media and technology usage, and attitudes toward 
social issues. Then, in a between-subjects design, all participants were randomly assigned to one 
of three experimental conditions. In this experiment, participants were given the same 
preliminary, or “warm-up,” questionnaire items as in study 1; and participants in study 2 were 
also instructed that they should draw a specific mark when they chose their answers.  
Compared to the design of study 1, there was an additional level of manipulation – a 
neutral O-mark condition (as a control). The experimenter asked participants to draw either 
check-marks, O-marks, or X-marks on their preferred choice options, depending on the condition 
to which they were randomly assigned. As in study 1, participants were informed that the 
experimenter would input all responses manually for statistical analysis and thus they should to 
draw as large as possible a specific mark over (or next to) the answer. After participants finished 
all filler items and outcome variable items, the experimenter additionally asked them to complete 
36 
 
a set of manipulation check measures. Participants provided their beliefs about the meaning of 
the mark that they were instructed to use for choosing the previous answers.  
 
Measures 
All filler measures were identical to those used in study 1. Participants were first given 
two sets of questionnaire items: one set of items that captured five dimensions of personality and 
the other set to assess media and technology usage. Again, those two sets of items functioned as 
filler items, which would lead participants to be fully engaged in certain marking behaviors (e.g., 
drawing check-marks on answers) before they were actually exposed to attitudinal questions 
regarding controversial social issues.  
 
Independent variable 
Three types of bodily experiences at the point of choice were manipulated through three 
marking behaviors. Participants’ beliefs about three marks were assessed as a manipulation 
check for the independent measure. Theories of embodied cognition have suggested that thinking 
about a stimulus is profoundly intertwined with bodily experiences that occurred when the 
stimulus was initially captured (Barsalou, 1999; Niedenthal, 2007). Therefore, understanding the 
way in which the target or any target-related information is interpreted is crucial to 
understanding what abstract mental concepts or psychological meanings people might attribute 
to their bodily experiences.  
Six items with 7-point scales were used to explore participants’ beliefs about the meaning 
of the different marks (e.g., The meaning of “O” can be closer to______; ranging from 1, bad, to 
7, good; 1, negative, to 7, positive; 1, unfavorable, to 7, favorable; 1, incorrect, to 7, correct; 1, 
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disagree, to 7, agree; and1, false, to 7, true (Cronbach’s alphas > .95). Participants only reported 
their beliefs about the mark that they were instructed to make. 
 
Dependent variable 
After completing all filler sections, participants were asked to honestly and accurately 
indicate their opinions on twenty social issues in a dichotomous manner with either agree or 
disagree, by drawing the same mark they used for choosing answers before. The social issues 
used as a dependent measure here (e.g., banning handgun ownership; legalized marijuana; 
increasing national defense spending) were those that divide Americans the most (GALLUP
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Social Poll, 2010-2014, see Appendix). As a primary dependent measure, all statements 
regarding divisive social issues were mixed up; some social issues were phrased as to endorse 
liberal perspectives and others were phrased as to represent conservative perspectives. I only 
used the total number of items that participants agreed with, summed across all of the issues.  
 
Results 
Manipulation check 
The participants reported the check-mark (M = 5.94, SD = 1.09) to be more positive than 
both the O-mark (M = 4.40, SD = 1.33, t (57) = -4.82, p < .001, 95% confidence interval (CI) for 
the difference between the two conditions = [.90, 1.78], Cohen’s d = 1.28) and the X-mark (M = 
1.90, SD = 1.04, t (64) = -15.26, p < .001, 95% confidence interval (CI) for the difference 
between the two conditions = [3.41, 4.15], Cohen’s d = 3.80). Participants felt the O mark to be 
more positive than the X mark, t (60) = -8.25, p < .001, 95% confidence interval (CI) for the 
difference between the two conditions = [1.64, 2.49], Cohen’s d = 2.14. Notably, the O-mark 
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was not significantly different from the midpoint of the scale, t (26) = 1.57, p = .13, Cohen’s d 
= .60, suggesting that the O-mark has a neutral connotation. Thus, I concluded that the 
manipulation was successful in that drawing the check-marks, X-marks, and O-marks guided 
positive, negative, and neutral bodily sensation, respectively. 
 
Hypothesis testing 
The effect of physical marking actions on participants’ tendency to agree with 
controversial statements was analyzed using an analysis of variance (ANOVA) with the marking 
type as a between-subjects factor. There was a significant effect of marking types, F (2, 89) = 5.0, 
p < .01, η2 = .10, as participants drawing the check-marks (M = 11.03, SD = 2.30) on their 
answers were more likely to agree with one side of the controversial social issues than those 
drawing the O-marks (M = 10.48, SD = 2.12) and the X-marks (M = 9.35, SD = 2.13) on their 
choice options (see Figure 4).  
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Figure 4. The embodied effects of marking on participants’ tendency to agree with statements 
about 20 divisive social policies and issues  
(All error bars indicate ± 1 standard error above and below the means) 
 
As hypothesized, participants who drew the check-marks to indicate their answers were 
more likely to agree with one side of the divisive social issues than those who drew the X-marks 
on their chosen options, t (64) = -3.05, p < .01, 95% confidence interval (CI) for the difference 
between the two conditions = [-.05, 1.48], Cohen’s d = .76. Participants who were asked to draw 
the O-marks on answers also tended to agree more with one side of the controversial social 
issues than those who drew the X marks, t (60) = -2.01, p < .05, 95% confidence interval (CI) for 
the difference between the two conditions = [-.27, 1.25], Cohen’s d = .53. However, there was no 
significant difference in judgments of social issues between the check-mark condition and the O-
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mark condition, providing t (57) = -.94, p = ns, 95% confidence interval (CI) for the difference 
between the two conditions = [-.56, 1.05], Cohen’s d = .255. 
As in study 1, participants, 77 US citizens and 15 non US citizens, did not interpret the 
meanings of marks differently. There was no difference observed in their likelihood of accepting 
(or rejecting) the controversial social issues between US citizens (M = 10.39, SD = 2.21) and 
international students (M = 9.53, SD = 2.56), t (91) = 1.34, p = ns, 95% confidence interval (CI) 
for the difference between the two conditions = [-.11, 1.68], Cohen’s d = .38. 
 
Discussion 
The results from study 2 replicated the previous findings of study 1. That is, physical acts 
of marking at the point of choice led participants to be more likely to agree (check-mark 
condition) or to disagree (X-mark condition) with assertions about controversial social issues. I 
argued that 1) bodily experiences of marking would function as metaphoric actions encouraging 
people to experience metaphorically related abstract social concepts like the binary of agree and 
disagree, and 2) such metaphoric actions would influence people’s tendency to agree or disagree 
with assertions about social policies and issues. 
The findings in study 2 indicated that participants shared beliefs about the three marks; 
the check-mark, the X-mark, and the O-mark were thought of as having a positive, a negative, 
and a neutral concept, respectively. This finding supported my broader claim that performing 
                                                          
5
 A post hoc multiple comparison test (the Tukey HSD pairwise comparisons) revealed that 
participants who drew the positively-valenced check-marks on choices tended to agree more with 
one side of the divisive social issues than those who drew the negatively-valenced  X-marks on 
answers (p < .05). 
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marking actions could make people behave in ways that are consistent with the metaphoric 
meanings of given marks. As I noted earlier, human conceptual systems such as perception and 
action are situated in a dynamic real-world environment, and conceptual metaphors typically 
play a role in connecting those cognitive mechanisms (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Landau et al., 
2010). Thus, metaphorically associated thoughts and actions are not mutually exclusive, and it is 
impossible to disentangle metaphoric thoughts from actions (Landau et al., 2010; Niedenthal et 
al., 2005). Since participants’ beliefs about the three marks were distinctively different, 
participants who drew such marks to answer questions were expected to, and did, respond 
differently. 
In addition, the results of study 2 demonstrated that three types of marking actions shifted 
participants in terms of the given divisive social issues. Specifically, participants who drew 
positively connoted check-marks tended to show a greater likelihood of agreeing with the 
divisive social policies and issues compared to those who had drawn negatively connoted X-
marks and neutral O-marks. It should be noted that these results do not mean that all participants 
would entirely change their stance on controversial social issues after performing marking 
actions. However, it seems unlikely that all participants would have strong opinions on every 
social policy or issue, and thus, these bodily experiences at the point of choice through different 
marking actions were swaying at least some participants (some of the time) to be in agreement or 
disagreement. Therefore, the pattern that emerged in study 2 suggested some evidence that 
differential marking behaviors might affect at least some participants’ tendency to agree or 
disagree with divisive social policies and issues. The way in which people physically respond to 
questions could unconsciously determine the psychological meaning of their marking activities 
and subsequent judgment. 
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It was also confirmed that all participants (e.g., U.S. citizens and non U.S. citizens) 
understood the meanings of marks similarly; no significant difference was found in terms of their 
likelihood of agreeing with the divisive social policies and issues. In sum, my two arguments 
above were supported. Study 2 first confirmed the metaphoric link between abstract social 
concepts and the marking actions, and it also provided evidence that bodily experiences of 
marking action could affect judgments of relatively familiar targets that were expected to be 
biased by their pre-existing beliefs or preferences. 
However, one might account for the results from studies 1 and 2 by asserting that 
people’s cognitive or behavioral responses could be also driven by incidentally activated 
knowledge structures or situationally increased concept accessibility, namely a priming account. 
Previous research on automaticity of higher cognitive processes has shown that priming could 
make people behave in ways consistent with the primes (Bargh et al., 2012). For instance, 
researchers found that individuals who imagined a typical college professor (i.e., priming 
intelligence or knowledgeability) tended to show better performance in a general knowledge test, 
compared to individuals who imagined a typical secretary; their follow-up study also found that 
individuals who were asked to imagine a typical soccer hooligan (i.e., priming stupidity) tended 
to exhibit worse performance in the same knowledge test, compared to those who received no 
priming (Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 1998). These findings suggested that perceiving a 
typical trait or a typical stereotype leads to the activation of mental representation of a relevant 
trait or a group and then influences people’s subsequent behaviors in ways consistent with 
attributes of the activated trait or stereotype. It should be noted that priming did not actually 
make individuals intelligent. Rather, individuals who were primed with a typical professor 
43 
 
tended to alter their behavioral strategies, and those strategies in turn made them think harder and 
ultimately better.  
In sum, priming could affect people’s judgment and decision making because it 
unconsciously influences perceptions and thoughts by making certain trait constructs more or 
less accessible. I have so far focused on only the effects of embodied experiences at the point of 
choice, leaving open the possibility that the current findings were due to priming effects. 
Therefore, study 3 is designed to compare participants’ judgments of the same divisive social 
policies and issues after performing check and X-marking actions and priming check and X-
marks. 
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5. DISSERTATION STUDY THREE: RULING OUT CONCEPTUAL PRIMING 
 
Introduction 
In study 2, I found that bodily experiences at the point of choice increased or decreased 
participants’ likelihood of accepting divisive social issues. Together with study 1, this result 
provided evidence that physically manipulated acts of marking could impact or even shape 
participants’ answers. However, it could be also possible that the act of seeing check- and x-
marks, rather than the act of marking, itself, affects participants’ judgments. Did positive or 
negative thoughts or feelings primed through the act of seeing check- and x-marks cause higher 
or lower levels of agreement with controversial social issues?  
There is some evidence that previous processing of a stimulus can exert a significant 
influence on subsequent processing of a similar or closely related stimulus, without people being 
aware of this influence (Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001). Researchers have demonstrated that human 
behavior can be triggered or more precisely primed by visual cues. Priming here is defined as 
“the incidental activation of knowledge structures, such as trait concepts and stereotypes, by the 
current situational context” (Bargh, Chen, & Burrow, 1996, p. 230).  
For instance, one classic study illustrated that the priming of trait concepts affects social 
perception (Srull & Wyer, 1979). Participants were primed one of two trait concepts, either 
hostility or kindness, through a sentence construction task. After completing this priming task, 
they participated in an ostensibly unrelated impression formation test; participants were asked to 
read behavioral descriptions of a hypothetical target person, but descriptions were ambiguous 
with respect to the previously primed traits. When participants rated the target person along a 
series of trait dimensions it was clear that the trait priming manipulations influenced participants’ 
45 
 
impression formation. Compared to participants who received no priming, participants who were 
primed with a certain trait (i.e., hostility) were more likely to evaluate the target as having the 
same trait (i.e., hostile) or semantically-related traits (i.e., unfriendly, dislikable). Priming 
increased the accessibility of trait concepts and then influenced subsequent impression formation 
of others. 
Another classic study also demonstrated automatic effects of priming on behavior by 
using stereotypes of the elderly (Bargh et al., 1996). Participants in this study were asked to work 
on a scrambled-sentence task; they were primed with words closely associated with the elderly 
stereotype (e.g., Florida, old, grey). After finishing the priming task, the experimenter recorded 
the amount of time that participants took to walk down the hall, from the doorway of the 
laboratory to the end of the corridor. People who were primed with the elderly stereotype 
exhibited a slower walking speed compared to those in a control condition who were primed 
with neutral words. Researchers speculated that this behavioral priming effect occurred because 
the elderly stereotype automatically activated knowledge that old people generally walk slowly; 
and this activated knowledge, in turn, caused people to move slowly. Thus, priming could 
automatically activate the stereotype and then lead people to even behave in ways consistent with 
that primed stereotype. 
As seen in the aforementioned studies, primed trait concepts can unconsciously (or 
automatically) influence people’s accessibility of the same trait concepts (direct priming) or 
related concepts (indirect priming) as well as people’s likelihood to behave consistent with the 
primes. Therefore, priming any trait constructs or stereotypes through visual cues can lead 
people to process relevant information and even behave in line with the primed cues. 
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Given that both conceptual priming and embodied cognition have their roots in the 
concept of automaticity of mental processes (Bargh et al., 2012), the underlying mechanism of 
embodiment is similar to priming in many ways. For instance, like priming effects, physical acts 
of marking serve as bodily cues that activate metaphorically related physical or psychological 
concepts, which make such metaphorical concepts or contents more accessible and thereby affect 
subsequent information processing and behaviors. Thus, there exists a possibility that the 
previous findings in study 1 and 2 might be due to priming (i.e., perceiving a mark 
unconsciously activates concepts closely linked to that mark) rather than to the embodied 
manipulations. As a follow-up study, I replicated study 2 with an additional set of experimental 
conditions to compare the observed embodied effects with the priming account. To ensure that 
the results from studies 1 and 2 were mostly due to manipulated marking actions, in study 3 I 
aimed to explore whether embodied outcomes derived from certain marking actions could also 
be influenced by primed thoughts or feelings that were triggered by the same marks that people 
used previously for making judgments.  
The priming manipulation took a form of an alternative instantiation of the marking 
action: stamping the check- or x-marks on answers (see Figure 5). Wooden stamps engraved 
with the check-mark or the X-mark were used to prime people with the marks on the stamps 
because those stamps could lead participants to engage in relatively similar sensorimotor activity 
(e.g., moving a hand) and simultaneously exposed them to the same visual stimuli that are 
assumed to activate the same metaphorical concepts (e.g., a stamp engraved with a check-mark – 
good, correct, agree, or yes). 
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Figure 5. Examples of stamps (The two highlighted stamps were used. The letter V was reshaped 
by cutting off the left edge; thus, it actually looked like a check-shaped mark.) 
 
The participants’ ways of marking were manipulated by having people either draw marks 
on answers (an embodied manipulation) or use stamps engraved with marks to select answers (a 
priming manipulation). As in previous studies, people used either a check-mark (positive) or a X-
mark (negative). To simplify the experiment, and reduce the number of participants required, I 
dropped the neutral O condition and focused on the total number of “agree” responses summed 
over the twenty divisive social issues. Thus, the study was a 2 (way of choice: drawing marks vs. 
using stamps engraved with marks) x 2 (type of mark: a positively connoted check vs. a 
negatively connoted X) between-subjects factorial design.  
If the results from studies 1 and 2 were just additional demonstrations of priming effects, 
then participants in the drawing and stamping conditions in study 3 should show approximately 
identical effects; participants who are producing check-marks should show greater agreement 
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with controversial statements than participants who are producing x-marks. This pattern of 
results would obtain only a main effect for type of mark. However, if there is something 
qualitatively different about making check- and x-marks by drawing them instead of seeing 
check- and x-marks appear as the result of a stamp, then an interaction effect should obtain: the 
effect of type of mark on level of agreement should be stronger among people who performed 
embodied checking and X-ing than among people who see checks and Xs appear as a result of 
stamping.  
 
Method 
Participants 
Seventy-nine undergraduate students from a public Midwestern university, 25 males and 
54 females, participated individually or in groups of up to eight (Mage = 20.18, SDage = .96). They 
were 71 US citizens and 8 international students. All participants completed study 3 in exchange 
for extra course credit.  
 
Procedure 
The same instructions and procedure from study 2 were used. When participants arrived 
at the laboratory, they were welcomed and were seated at rectangular desks divided by partitions. 
As in study 2, the cover story again informed participants that the present study examined 
whether a meaningful relation exists among personality traits, media and technology use, and 
attitudes toward social issues. The experimenter asked participants to sign a consent form and 
randomly assigned them into one of four experimental conditions.  
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Study 3 was conducted using paper-and-pencil (or stamps) and I repeated a similar 
procedure to study 2 except that participants were required either to draw a certain mark or to use 
a stamp engraved with the certain mark to choose their answers. Participants in the stamp 
condition were given general instructions for the stamp usage. The experimenter told participants 
that they could press the stamp to the black-colored inkpad and then apply the stamp to their 
answers. As in study 2, participants were first asked to complete the two sets of filler items that 
reflected five dimensions of personality traits and a second set to measure media and technology 
usage. Next, the twenty controversial social issues were judged in a dichotomous manner with 
either agree or disagree, by drawing either a check or X mark, or by using a stamp imprinted 
with either a check or X mark. After completing the primary dependent outcome items, 
participants were asked to answer a set of manipulation check items. 
 
Measures 
All measures – the filler items, manipulation check items, and dependent variable - were 
identical to those used in study 2. Participants’ responses to the filler items were not used for 
further statistical analyses. Again, all filler items aimed at making participants perform given 
marking actions a sufficient number of times, leading them to 1) be fully engaged in marking 
actions at the point of choice (i.e., drawing marks condition) or 2) be primed with the marks (i.e., 
stamping marks).  
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Results 
Manipulation check 
I used the same manipulation check items from the previous study to test participants’ 
beliefs about the meaning of the check and X-marks. Again, participants reported the check-
mark (M = 5.87, SD = .90) to be more positive than the X-mark (M = 2.54, SD = 1.99, t (78) = -
15.61, p < .001, 95% confidence interval (CI) for the difference between the two conditions = 
[3.25, 3.84], Cohen’s d = 3.53). In addition, such beliefs about targets (i.e., check-mark) did not 
differ across experimental conditions. A two-way, between participants ANOVA testing effects 
of marking types (check v. X) and marking actions (drawing v. stamping) on participants’ beliefs 
about the meanings of the marks revealed no effect of marking actions, F (1, 75) = 2.00, p = ns, 
and no interaction between marking actions and marking types, F (1, 75) < 1, p = ns. Again, only 
the main effect of types of mark was significant, F (1, 75) = 244.73, p < .0001, η2 = .76. Thus, I 
concluded that the manipulation here was successful, suggesting that participants in all 
experimental conditions were prone to perceive the check-mark as more positive and the X-mark 
as more negative. 
 
Hypothesis testing 
In studies 1 and 2 cultural backgrounds (e.g., U.S. citizens vs. non U.S. citizens) did not 
affect the way participants construe the meanings of the marks, so I did not analyze culture 
further. A 2 (way of choice: drawing marks vs. using stamps engraved with marks) x 2 (type of 
mark: a positively connoted check-mark vs. a negatively connoted X-mark) ANOVA was 
performed on participants’ likelihood of accepting controversial social issues. The main effect of 
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way of choice was not significant, F (1, 75) < 1, p = ns. However, there was a marginally 
significant main effect of type of mark, showing participants in the positively connoted check-
mark condition (M = 10.53, SD = 1.96) were more likely to agree with one side of the divisive 
social issues than those in the negatively connoted X-mark condition (M = 9.64, SD = 1.93), F (1, 
75) = 3.87, p = .05, η2 = .05. The interaction between ways of choice and types of mark was also 
marginally significant, F (1, 75) = 2.98, p = .08, η2 = .04.  
As depicted in Figure 6, participants who were asked to draw check-marks on their 
answers tended to agree with significantly more controversial social issues (M = 10.86, SD = 
1.80) than those who were instructed to place X-marks on their answers (M = 9.25, SD = 1.92), t 
(40) = -2.77, p < .01, 95% confidence interval (CI) for the difference between the two conditions 
= [.09, 1.70], Cohen’s d = .86. However, the same pattern was not observed between participants 
who used the stamp engraved with the check-mark (M = 10.16, SD = 2.12) and those who used 
the stamp engraved with the X-mark (M = 10.05, SD = 1.90), t (37) = -.16, p = ns, 95% 
confidence interval (CI) for the difference between the two conditions = [-.90, .91], Cohen’s d 
= .05. In addition, further simple effects analyses indicated that participants’ tendency to agree 
with social policies and issues did not differ between when they drew and stamped the check-
mark on answers, t (39) = 1.13, p = ns, 95% confidence interval (CI) for the difference between 
the two conditions = [-.41, 1.31], Cohen’s d = .36 and when they drew and stamped the X-mark 
on answers, t (38) = -1.31, p = ns, 95% confidence interval (CI) for the difference between the 
two conditions = [-.44, 1.26], Cohen’s d = .42. 
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Figure 6. The effects of type of mark by the way of choice on mean number of agreements  
(The error bars indicate ± 1 standard error above and below the means) 
 
Discussion 
If the current results were due to conceptual priming effects, there would be no reason to 
expect any interaction effect; priming and marking manipulations would operate similarly and 
there would only be a main effect of type of mark. However, the interaction between ways of 
choice and types of mark was marginally significant (p = .08). The planned comparisons 
indicated that participants who drew the check-marks tended to agree with more of the divisive 
social policies and issues than those who drew the X-marks (p < .01); however, participants who 
stamped check and X-marks agreed with roughly the same number of statements (p = ns). Thus, 
although the interaction that distinguishes the embodied effects of marking from priming effects 
was only marginally significant, the results of study 3 provided some support that bodily 
manipulated marking actions influence participants’ judgment above and beyond priming. 
Similar to priming effects, physical experiences of marking action could serve as bodily cues that 
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trigger metaphorically associated concepts and, in turn, influence how people think and make 
decisions. However, as compared with priming effects, embodied cognition effects could be 
considered as a strong manifestation within the same domain of automaticity effect. 
This study also demonstrated that physical acts of marking can convey the metaphorically 
associated meanings of abstract concepts, and then lead participants to make judgments 
consistent with such bodily experienced concepts. The way people physically respond to 
questions can influence participants’ subsequent judgment and decision-making in predictable 
ways. 
Again, study 3 provided solid support for my primary hypothesis – physically 
experienced marking actions at the point of choice affect subsequent judgments and decision 
making. Furthermore, the alternative explanation of priming was compared with the effects of 
such embodiment and eliminated; physically experienced marking actions that cue 
metaphorically related social concepts uniquely alter how people construe their decision 
situations and ultimately what they chose. Together with studies 1 and 2, study 3 therefore 
advanced the understanding of embodied cognition and provided important theoretical insights.   
Recent research further found that incidental bodily experiences (e.g., postures) could 
cause physiological changes and thus lead people to shift their behavioral choices (Carney et al., 
2010). People tended to take a more risky choice in a gambling task after making and holding 
high-power poses (i.e., relatively expansive postures with open limbs); others were less likely to 
take the same risky choice after making and holding low-power poses (i.e., contractive postures 
with closed limbs). To explicate a possible underlying mechanism of the embodied effects above, 
the authors provided physiological evidence that high-power poses increased testosterone but 
decreased cortisol, while low-power poses increased cortisol but decreased testosterone. Given 
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that levels of testosterone and cortisol reflect dominance and stress respectively, individuals who 
made high-power poses (vs. low-power poses) experienced increased testosterone as well as 
decreased cortisol. Differing hormone levels elicited feelings of power and then influenced 
individuals’ willingness to take the gambling risk. 
Considering the link between neuroendocrine and behavioral responses above, bodily 
experienced acts of marking in the dissertation were not only related to metaphorically related 
social concepts but might also be associated with physiological changes that nudge participants 
to make certain behavioral choices. However, note that this explication is speculative rather than 
empirically demonstrated in the current study. 
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6. DISSERTATION STUDY FOUR: EVALUATIVE JUDGMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF 
CONSUMER BEHAVIOR 
 
Introduction 
Study 1 primarily focused on whether physically manipulated ways of marking influence 
evaluative judgments of novel and neutral targets. Studies 2 and 3 centered on whether such 
manipulated ways of marking also nudge people toward being more or less agreeable regarding 
divisive social policies and issues. These studies demonstrated two major findings: 1) metaphoric 
concepts (or meanings), such as “yes” and “no” or “likes” and “dislikes” could be activated by 
bodily actions, and 2) the activated concepts can influence people’s subsequent judgment and 
decision-making, leading people to evaluate affectively neutral targets as more or less favorable 
and encouraging people to be more or less agreeable. Taken together, the current study has 
addressed that physical acts of making that convey the metaphorically related concepts of “yes” 
and “no” or “likes” and “dislikes” influence people’s likelihood to behave in line with the 
previously experienced concepts.  
Researchers have recently developed the field of sensory marketing, which refers to 
“marketing that engages the consumers’ senses and affects their perception, judgment, and 
behavior” (Krishna, 2012, p. 332). Within this new perspective, researchers have explained a role 
of bodily states or actions in the evaluation of consumer products (Krishna, 2012). In addition, 
empirical studies have illustrated that bodily sensations guide consumers’ subsequent judgments 
(Krishina & Schwarz, 2014). For instance, previous studies have revealed a relationship between 
physical temperature and subjective interpersonal warmth. Zwebner, Lee, and Goldenberg (2014) 
postulated that people show increased product valuations when they are exposed to physically 
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warm situations (e.g., in a warm space). They argued that physical warmth activates socio-
emotional warmth and in turn results in decreased psychological distance from given consumer 
products. To test this temprature premium effect, participants were instructed to touch and 
evaluate a warm or cool pad first. Afterward, the experimenters put a pen on the desk and asked 
participants to estimate its distance from them. As results, participants who were asked to 
interact with the warm pad tended to estimate the pen to be physically closer compared to those 
who had interacted with the cool pad; more importantly, they were willing to pay more money 
for that pen. Huang, Zhang, Hui, and Wyer (2014) also investigated whether temperature affects 
consumers’ tendency to conform to others’ opinions in decision making situations. They found 
that exposure to a warm temperature caused participants to be more likely to conform with others’ 
opinions because a warm temperature (vs. cool) increased subjective feelings of closeness to 
others, and thus participants tended to evaluate others’ opinions as being more valid. 
Some sensory marketing researchers have suggested potential links between tactile 
senations and metaphorically related pscyhological concepts. Peck and Shu (2009), for instance, 
showed that merely touching a product can elicit greater perceived ownership, which in turn 
leads consumers to have a higher valuation of it. However, this positive haptic effect only 
occured when touching resulted in positive sensory experiences (e.g., touching an enjoyable 
metal Slinky) because negative experiences of touching (e.g., touching Playfoam beads) 
generated lower affective reactions. Brasel and Gips’s research (2014) extended the current 
knowledge of haptic sensation effects on consumer behavior to an online shopping context. They 
found that haptic interfaces (e.g., touchscreens) generated stronger levels of endowment leading 
people to overvalue products that they experienced through the sense of virtual touch, though 
such interfaces did not actually allow people to touch products during online shopping. Their 
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findings revealed that sensory experience with touch screens (e.g., tablet) increases 
psychological ownership, and more importantly, causes people to overvalue virtual products 
(Brasel & Gips, 2014). 
As was suggested by the aforementioned embodied cognition research in a consumer 
context, physical experiences can make us process metaphorically related mental concepts and 
then behave in ways that are consistent with the activated concepts’ metaphorical meanings. If 
subtle or incidental bodily sensations (e.g., seeing the X-mark or hearing the X sound in English) 
could successfully drive consumer cognition and subsequent judgment, overt bodily actions at 
the point of choice (e.g., drawing X-marks) would have a stronger influence than sensations on 
how consumers think, feel, and behave.  
Therefore, in study 4, I extended my previous findings to the context of consumer 
research by examining if bodily manipulated acts of marking affect subsequent evaluative 
judgments of consumer products. I conducted an experiment to explore whether marking actions 
increase or decrease people’s affective responses to actual consumer products – different flavors 
of coffee. Again, physical actions were expected to influence participants’ affective reactions to 
different coffee flavors (e.g., judgments of liking), leading participants to rate them as more 
pleasant when answering with check-marks than X-marks. 
 
Method 
Participants 
A total of 79 undergraduate students recruited from a public Midwestern university 
participated in the experiment. Two were eliminated from further analyses because they failed to 
follow instructions. Thus, 77 undergraduate students (21 males and 56 females, Mage = 19.82, 
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SDage = 1.02) participated in this experiment in exchange for extra course credit. They were 72 
US citizens and 5 international students; in a between-subjects design, they were randomly 
assigned to one of two experimental conditions as groups of four to ten. 
 
Procedure 
All procedures were identical to those used in the previous studies, except that 
participants believed that the current study was about the relationship among personality traits, 
media and technology usage, and their taste evaluations of various coffee flavors. Participants 
were first seated at rectangular desks divided by partitions and asked to sign consent forms. 
Afterward, participants were randomly assigned to one of two experimental conditions, either 
drawing the check-mark condition or the X-mark condition; they were instructed to complete the 
randomly-selected filler items first. Next, participants were exposed to images of nine different 
coffee flavors from Folgers Gourmet Selections K-Cup
®
: French Roast, Black Silk, Hazelnut 
Cream, Vanilla Biscotti, Mocha Swirl, Lively Colombian, Classic Roast, Caramel Drizzle, and 
Morning Café. Participants were then asked to indicate their evaluations of each of the nine 
different coffee flavors by drawing the same mark they used for choosing the previous answers. 
After completing this evaluation task, participants answered questions regarding their 
demographic characteristics and indicated their general liking for coffee. 
 
Measures 
The filler items were identical to those used in previous studies. Again, such items aimed 
to make participants perform given marking actions a sufficient number of times before they 
respond to the primary dependent measure. In addition, to limit any confounds associated with 
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prior attitudes toward or preference for coffee, participants’ liking for coffee was assessed by a 
single item (e.g., “In general, how much do you like coffee?”) on a scale ranging from 1, Not at 
all to 7, Very much (M = 4.69, SD = 2.03). 
 
Dependent variable 
After completing two sets of filler items, participants were exposed to images of Folgers 
Gourmet Selections K-Cup
® 
(see Figure 7), which depicted nine different coffee flavors. I used 
the RAND function from Microsoft Excel to randomize all flavors and utilized two differently-
ordered versions for the taste evaluation task. Before this task, participants were told that they 
would encounter randomly-selected actual coffee flavors. Participants were asked to think about 
having those different coffee flavors and then provide their overall evaluations for each coffee 
flavor on two aspects with response options on six-point scales: how tasty the given coffee flavor 
was, anchored at 1 = Very poor taste to 6 = Very good taste and how delicious the given coffee 
flavor was, anchored at 1 = Not at all delicious to 6 = Very delicious. These two questionnaire 
items were then averaged to generate a single composite (M = 3.94, SD = .91, Cronbach’s alpha 
= .99). 
 
 
Figure 7. Examples of experimental stimuli, Folgers Gourmet Selections K-Cup
®
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Results 
Hypothesis testing 
An independent samples t test revealed the hypothesized embodied effect on participants’ 
evaluative judgment. Compared to participants who drew negative X-marks on their answers (M 
= 3.64, SD = .87), participants who were asked to draw positive check-marks (M = 4.25, SD 
= .85) were more likely to rate flavors of coffee favorably, t = -3.10, p < .01, 95% confidence 
interval (CI) for the difference between the two conditions = [.44, .99], Cohen’s d = .71 (see 
Figure 8). In particular, participants evaluated the nine random-ordered coffee flavors as tastier 
after engaging in marking actions that triggered positive mental concepts (e.g., drawing check-
marks) while participants reported that the same nine flavors of coffee seemed less delicious 
after performing marking actions that activated negative psychological concepts (e.g., drawing 
X-marks).  
 
 
Figure 8. Mean taste evaluations by types of marking actions  
(The error bars represent ± 1 standard error above and below the means) 
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In addition, I attempted to isolate an alternative explanation that participants’ general 
liking for coffee could influence their evaluative judgments of coffee flavors. An additional test 
result confirmed that there was no significant difference in terms of liking coffee between the 
check-mark condition ((M = 4.97, SD = 1.86) and the X-mark condition (M = 4.39, SD = 2.19), t 
(76) = -1.26, p = ns.  
 
Discussion 
Replicating previous findings, study 4 demonstrated that bodily experiences of marking 
action could make participants behave in line with the meanings of previously experienced 
concepts. Participants who drew check-marks tended to evaluate coffee flavors as more pleasant, 
whereas those who drew X-marks tended to evaluate coffee flavors as less pleasant. By simply 
altering the way participants physically respond to consumer products, study 4 provided 
evidence that differential marking behavior influenced how much participants like different 
coffees. I speculate that such differential marking caused cognitive processing of metaphorically 
related concepts like the binaries of good and bad or positive and negative and, in turn, resulted 
in biased judgments. Physically experienced markings affected judgments in ways consistent 
with metaphoric concepts related to those marking behaviors.   
In addition, as I described in the method section, I attempted to measure participants’ 
general liking for coffee at the end of the paper-and-pencil survey with some demographic 
questions to rule out an unwanted confounding between their pre-existing preferences for coffee 
and evaluative judgments of coffee flavors. If participants responded to a question regarding 
their general liking for coffee after they performed certain marking actions, one might assume 
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that participants who drew check-marks (vs. X-marks) were prone to say they were avid drinkers 
of coffee regardless of their pre-existing preferences. However, the result revealed that there was 
no difference in terms of liking for coffee between the two experimental conditions. Why might 
this be the case?  
Consider Williams and Bargh’s (2008) study. In the first experiment, they found that 
individuals who held a warm cup of coffee (vs. a cold cup of coffee) tended to form impressions 
of random people as warm. Interestingly, they suggested that bodily sensations of warmth (vs. 
coldness) unconsciously influenced individuals’ feelings of interpersonal warmth and then led to 
social judgments consistent with such activated feelings of warmth. However, we don’t have 
much knowledge about how long this embodied effect lasts. I speculate that effects of 
embodiment would not continue beyond a short time period; perhaps, a few minutes following 
the embodiment manipulation, individuals who previously held the warm cup of coffee would 
almost certainly form impressions of others based on their gut feelings rather than 
experimentally induced physical warmth.  
Thus, drawing on the example explicated above, the finding that there was no difference 
in term of liking for coffee across the experimental conditions could be considered as 
representing the dynamic (i.e., time-variant) nature of embodied cognition. I argue that 
performing positive marking action such as drawing check-marks could push people toward 
positive judgments; however, the effects of physically experienced marking may not persist for 
long time periods. Embodied effects would taper off as soon as people stop making check marks, 
or put down warm cups of coffee. 
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7. DISSERTATION STUDY FIVE: CONSUMER CHOICE 
 
Introduction 
As demonstrated by studies 1-4, bodily experiences at the point of choice can nudge 
people to make a particular choice. Physically manipulated check-marking and X-marking 
actions metaphorically associated with abstract concepts of yes and no, respectively, caused 
people to make choices in ways that were consistent with such concepts. Thus, like the core 
assumption of embodied cognition, I found that human cognition is grounded in peoples’ 
physical experiences such as bodily actions. 
Given the fact that bodily experiences of abstract concepts can exert an influence on 
shaping our thoughts and subsequent behaviors, many researchers have so far taken a metaphor-
focused approach, mainly centering on whether certain metaphors and metaphoric actions drive 
cognitive operations and ultimately influence human judgments (Landau et al., 2010). However, 
as a result of much focus on identifying possible associations between metaphorically related 
physical and mental concepts, this line of research could not fully capture boundary conditions 
under which embodied experiences are retained or eliminated. Thus, I adopted a phenomenon-
focused approach (Landau et al., 2010), which attempted to find a determinant that might 
influence the effect of marking actions on judgment. 
To provide insight into the impact of metaphoric marking action, in study 5, I posited an 
additional factor that would shape a choice context in which people make judgments, namely 
choice architecture. Before I explain this choice architecture further shortly, I review a well-
known example of such phenomena. People have witnessed that small changes in decision 
elements or choice assortment (i.e., organization of choice options) can have a significant impact 
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on their choices (Kahneman, & Tversky, 1984). For instance, think about the following 
hypothetical decision making problem below (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, p. 453). 
 
Decision problem: 
Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, 
which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the 
disease have been proposed.  
 
If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. 
If Program B is adopted, there is a one-third probability that 600 people will be 
saved and a two-thirds probability that no people will be saved. 
 
Question: Which of the two programs would you prefer? 
 
Researchers found that people preferred Program A (72%) to B (28%) when they were 
asked to choose a favorable option between the two programs. Considering that people generally 
prioritize avoiding losses over making gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 2000), this finding 
suggested that: 1) when gain was framed or highlighted in the choice option, people were more 
likely to choose that option, and 2) when loss was framed or emphasized in the same choice 
option, people were less likely to choose that option (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Thus, the 
example above illustrated that people were prone to choose Program A (vs. Program B) because 
it highlighted gains rather than losses.  
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Based on such understanding of how people behave, researchers have demonstrated that 
differentially framing choice options could make people exhibit systematically different choice 
outcomes and preferences (Kahneman, 2011). In a similar vein, researchers recently coined a 
term, choice architecture, and argued that the ways questions are framed or presented can shape 
answers (Johnson et al., 2012; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008; Thaler, Sunstein, & Balz, 2014). Here, 
choice architecture can be understood as the presentation or organization of possible choice 
options (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). Like the examples above, the same question, choice option, 
and decision outcome can be presented in different ways. Choice architecture plays an important 
role in organizing a context of judgment or a frame of decision, which can influence people’s 
conceptions regarding possible outcomes and ultimately their actual choices. Thus, if a choice 
designer frames the same decision problem through either a gain or a loss message frame, or if a 
choice architect presents the same question in a positive or a negative style of wording, people’s 
judgment and decision making could be affected.  
Altering decision frames affects how choice-related information is processed and, more 
importantly, what is chosen. For instance, having too many choice options (known as choice 
overload) has a detrimental effect on people’s motivation to choose (Iyengar and Lepper, 2000). 
People were less likely to choose something to buy when they were given too many choices (e.g., 
choosing one from 4 vs. 24 different jams). 
Further evidence of choice architecture effects is evident in the way default options can 
influence people’s choices (Johnson & Goldstein, 2003). People were more willing to be organ 
donors when the default was to be an organ donor (i.e., the opt-out condition, no choice needs to 
be made to be a donor but choice is necessary to avoid becoming a donor). However, people 
were less willing to be organ donors when they were informed that they would have to choose to 
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be an organ donor (i.e., the opt-in condition, no choice needs to be made to not be a donor, but 
choice is necessary for becoming a donor). In sum, previous studies successfully pointed out the 
fact that the way a choice is framed could affect what is chosen.  
In study 5 I aimed to take a phenomenon-focused approach by examining a specific 
context in which people’s judgments are more or less likely to be influenced by physical 
experiences of marking actions. Thus, I proposed another set of conditions that I expected to be 
affected by bodily experiences at the point of choice – question framing. Question framing was 
operationally defined as the presentation of a question that is framed through using either a 
positive or a negative style of language. Question framing here was manipulated as the same 
question written in positive wording (positive framing) or negative wording (negative framing). 
Previous literature regarding the role of conceptual metaphor in thought and action has 
argued that the same target concept could be mapped onto different metaphoric thoughts and 
actions; thus, the same abstract target concept could be understood in more than one way 
(Landau et al., 2010). In other words, the activation of the abstract concepts, check and X (i.e., 
abstract concepts such as the binaries of yes and no, agree and disagree, and positive and 
negative), could be achieved through not only a biased thought derived from the way a choice is 
framed but also a physical sensation derived from the act of marking.  
Drawing on prior research in conceptual metaphor theory, I tested a hypothesis that 
physical experiences of marking action and the framing of questions would interact to influence 
subsequent consumer judgments. I would expect a meaningful interplay of those two factors in 
shaping answers; a bodily experienced marking action would have a stronger impact on 
subsequent judgment and decision making when the metaphoric meaning of given marking 
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action (i.e., drawing positively connoted check-mark vs. negatively connoted X-marks) is 
consistent with that of question framing (positive vs. negative framing).  
To be specific, when the positively connoted check-marking is matched with the question 
frame denoting the abstract social concept of likes (i.e., the question written in positive wording), 
people would choose more targets as likable. In contrast, when the negatively connoted X-
marking is matched with the question framed as presenting dislikes (i.e., the question presented 
in negative language), people would choose fewer targets as dislikable. If this reasoning is 
correct, most likes would be obtained in a positively-matched condition - the positive check-
marking and the positively-framed question condition, while least dislikes would be obtained in a 
negatively-matched condition - the negative X-marking and the negatively-framed question 
condition. Choosing by indicating likes and dislikes can result in similar outcomes when one 
group has most likes (positively matched condition) and another has fewest dislikes (negatively 
matched condition).  Liking eight out of ten items results in choosing eight items, whereas 
disliking two out of ten items results in choosing eight items. Moreover, a moderate number of 
likes (or dislikes) would be observed in the two remaining mismatched conditions.  
 
Method 
Participants 
One hundred three undergraduate students from a large public Midwestern university 
(Mage = 19.92, SDage = 1.08) completed this experiment in exchange for extra course credit (25 
males, 78 females). Participants were 99 US citizens and 4 international students. Run in groups 
with an upper limit of ten, all participants were randomly assigned into one of four experimental 
conditions in a 2 (way of choice: drawing check-mark vs. X-mark) x 2 (type of framing: positive 
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framing vs. negative framing) between-subjects factorial design. In study 5, as in the previous 
studies, physical acts of choice were manipulated by asking participants either to draw positive 
check-marks or negative X-marks on their answers. The two types of choice architecture were 
manipulated by using two distinctive choice frames, either a positively framed question (e.g., 
how many flavors did you like?) or a negatively framed question (e.g., how many flavors didn’t 
you like?). 
 
Procedure 
When participants arrived at the laboratory, they were asked to sign consent forms. 
Participants were then randomly assigned into one of four experimental conditions and were 
seated at rectangular desks that were divided by partitions. All participants were led to believe 
that they were taking part in two unrelated experiments: one was a test of a relation between their 
personality traits and media and technology usage; the other was a taste test in which they would 
evaluate different flavors of food offered by the experimenter. In fact, these experiments were a 
single study. 
Participants were explicitly instructed to draw certain marks as large as possible over (or 
next to) their answers (e.g., drawing check-marks) and were asked to complete filler items that 
were the same items used in the previous studies. After completing this paper-and-pencil survey, 
they were thanked and told that the first experiment was finished.  
The same experimenter handed out a small packet to each participant, which included the 
instruction sheet and a set of questionnaire items regarding actual taste evaluation. All 
participants were told that the second food taste study would take place soon. In order to make 
the cover story of food tasting plausible, participants were explicitly informed that it would be a 
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taste evaluation and recognition task with ten different flavors of jelly beans that currently exist 
on the market. I used Jelly Belly
®’s 49 original flavors of jelly bean, and randomly selected ten 
different flavors of jelly beans from among the 49 flavors for each participant; thus, participants 
had differently assorted flavors of jelly bean (see Figure 9).  
All participants were first asked to taste ten different flavors of jelly beans that were 
prepared in advance. To prevent any unwanted influence derived from the brand (e.g., brand 
image or reputation), each participant was served jelly beans in a 2.5 oz stainless steel cup. Next, 
they evaluated flavors in terms of the number of flavors they liked (positive framing) or flavors 
they did not like (negative framing) by drawing the same mark they used previously for 
answering. Afterward, to be consistent with the cover story, participants were asked to recognize 
the flavors they had tasted; they were exposed to a list of the 49 original flavors of jelly bean and 
were asked to choose all flavors they thought they had received. After finishing the two tasks, the 
taste evaluation task and the taste recognition task, I asked participants to indicate their opinions 
on the overall quality of the jelly beans at the end of the experiment. 
 
 
Figure 9. Experimental stimuli, Jelly Belly
®
 jelly beans 
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Measures 
All filler measures (i.e., filler items such as personality traits and media and technology 
usage) were identical to those used in the previous studies and were not further analyzed. In 
study 5 I used the number of flavors that participants liked after tasting as a primary dependent 
variable, so for positive frame conditions I summed the number of items each participant marked 
(because they were told to mark items they liked) and for negative frame conditions I summed 
the number of items each participant left unmarked (because they were told to mark items they 
did not like). After answering the main dependent measure, all participants were given a follow-
up recognition task (i.e., perceived taste - flavor matching task) to be consistent with the cover 
story of the taste evaluation and recognition test. In particular, participants were exposed to a list 
of the 49 flavors of jelly bean (e.g., Jelly Belly’s The Original Gourmet Jelly Bean® such as 
Buttered Popcorn, Chocolate Pudding) for the taste –flavor matching test, in which they were 
asked to identify all flavors they previously tasted. However, this recognition memory test was 
also an unrelated filler task. The overall quality of the assorted jelly bean flavors was measured 
as a control variable to limit any influence of taste quality derived from differently administered 
jelly beans. Participants were asked to answer a single question: “on average, the taste of 10 Jelly 
Bean flavors was ________”, with response options on seven-point scales, 1, Very poor quality 
to 7, Very good quality (M = 4.62, SD = 1.49).  
 
Dependent variable 
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The number of flavors that participants liked was measured as a dependent variable. After 
engaging in the taste evaluation task (i.e., taste ten different flavors of jelly bean), participants 
were asked to answer a single question of their choice. Participants in the positive framing 
condition were asked to answer a question, “How many flavors did you like out of the 10 
different flavors you just have tasted?”, which was presented in a positive language. In contrast, 
participants in the negative framing condition were informed to answer a question, “How many 
flavors didn’t you like out of the 10 different flavors you just have tasted?”, which seemed 
similar but was framed in a negative manner. In order to interpret the results more intuitively, the 
number of flavors that participants left unmarked (in the negative framing condition, only) was 
calculated. Thus, the mean number of likable jelly bean flavors was used for further statistical 
analyses (M = 5.84, SD = 2.28). 
 
Results 
Hypothesis testing 
I found that the overall quality of jelly bean assortments did not differ across 
experimental conditions (no main effects or interaction were observed), all Fs < 2.28, p = ns; 
there was no significant difference in terms of perceived quality of administered jelly beans. To 
test the main hypothesis, I first carried out a two-way ANOVA on the number of likable jelly 
beans. No main effects were found, all Fs < 2.03, ps = ns. However, the ANOVA yielded a 
significant interaction effect, F (1, 99) = 6.70, p < .05, η2 = .06 (see Figure 10).  
Results derived from a simple effects analysis indicated that participants who were asked 
to draw check-marks on their answers chose marginally more jelly beans as likable when the 
choice question was positively presented (M = 6.20, SD = 2.33) rather than when the question 
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was negatively framed (M = 4.84, SD = 2.62), t (49) = -1.94, p = .06, 95% confidence interval 
(CI) for the difference between the two conditions = [-.36, 1.58], Cohen’s d = .55. A simple 
effects analysis also showed that participants who drew X-marks on their answers were prone to 
choose marginally more jelly beans as likable when the choice question was negatively 
addressed (M = 6.59, SD = 1.89) rather than when the question was positively designed (M = 
5.69, SD = 1.98), t (52) = -1.70, p = .09, 95% confidence interval (CI) for the difference between 
the two conditions = [-.25, 1.23], Cohen’s d = .47.  
 
 
Figure 10. Mean number of choices as a function of way of choice and type of framing  
(All error bars represent ± 1 standard error above and below the means) 
 
The current finding demonstrated that bodily experiences at the point of choice could 
interact with the choice framing and subsequently influence consumer choices. Particularly, 
when the way people physically or bodily respond to the question was consistent with the way a 
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choice was framed, there was a stronger impact of embodiment on participants’ subsequent 
judgment and decision-making. 
 
Discussion 
In study 5 I aimed to demonstrate that the embodied effects of marking action at the point 
of choice could extend beyond cognitive and affective responses toward experimental targets 
(i.e., agreements toward divisive social policies and issues, evaluative judgments on novel 
objects as well as consumer products) to subsequent consumer choices. The results offered 
empirical support for my hypothesis in that they suggested that physical acts of marking could 
have a stronger matching effect on subsequent judgments when the metaphoric concepts residing 
in certain marking actions and question frames were consistent.  
In study 5 I found that when people made check-marks, they tended to choose more 
targets. Thus, in the positive question framing condition, check marking behaviors led to more 
likes and, in the negative question framing condition, the same check marking behaviors led to 
more dislikes. In contrast, when people made X-marks on their answers, they were prone to 
choose fewer targets; so, in the positive question framing condition, X marking led to fewer likes 
and, in the negative question framing condition, such X-marking led to fewer dislikes. However, 
since this explication involved the logic of the double-positive and the double-negative, it was 
difficult to interpret the key findings intuitively. Thus, I interpreted choosing fewer dislikes the 
same as choosing more likes. 
When choosing fewer dislikes and choosing more likes were used interchangeably, clear 
and consistent patterns were observed. When participants were given a positively-framed 
question (e.g., how many flavors did you like?), performing positively connoted check-mark 
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actions (vs. negatively connoted X-mark actions) made them choose more jelly bean flavors as 
likable. In contrast, when participants were given a negatively-framed question (e.g., how many 
flavors didn’t you like?), performing negatively connoted X-mark actions (vs. positively 
connoted check-mark actions) encouraged participants to select fewer jelly bean flavors as 
dislikable; or to put it another way, performing X-marking guided participants to choose more 
flavors as likable. 
Taken together, I speculate that when the embodied ways of choice were matched (vs. 
mismatched) with the corresponding frames of question, people could easily understand and 
recruit the metaphoric concepts derived from a decision context. Thus, concrete bodily 
experiences of marking actions could significantly affect how people understand decision 
contexts and, more importantly, how they act and decide. 
In study 5, I found potential boundary conditions that could limit the embodied effects of 
marking action on judgments. Just as differential marking behavior leads to different judgments, 
question framing also facilitates cognitive biases and, in turn, prompts people to make judgments 
based on such biases. Thus, study 5 provided evidence that question framing could interact with 
the bodily experiences of marking and then influence subsequent judgment in predictable ways. 
Moreover, study 5 provided further support for the dynamic (i.e., time-variant) nature of 
embodied cognition. In order to control for any unwanted influence stemming from the quality of 
jelly bean mixtures, I asked participants to indicate the quality of the jelly bean assortments at 
the end of the survey. Regardless of the inclusion of overall quality as a covariate (i.e., both 
ANOVA and ANCOVA), study 5 yielded no main effects (all Fs < 2.03, p = ns) but significant 
interactions (all Fs > 6.70, p < .05, η2 > .06). However, if bodily experiences of marking action 
could reliably guide participants’ subsequent judgments, I should find at least the main effect of 
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the way of choice (e.g., drawing check vs. X-marks). As I have speculated in study 4, this result 
might imply that the embodied effects of marking action could not be continued beyond a short 
time period. Again, the effects of physically experienced marking could not persist for very long; 
rather, such effects tend to gradually wear off. 
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8. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
The goal of this dissertation was to uncover whether physical acts of marking at the point 
of choice affect how people make judgments and decisions. Indeed, the body matters, and the 
physical and conceptual link exists. Across five experiments, I found support for the hypothesis 
that people’s bodily experiences of marking guide their subsequent judgments in a metaphoric 
manner. To be specific, differential marking behaviors with check and X-marks could reliably 
shape how people think and make judgments. Study 1 demonstrated that bodily experienced 
marking actions influence people’s evaluative judgments for affectively-neutral stimuli; people 
who drew check-marks on their answers evaluated neutral visual stimuli (e.g., Chinese 
pictographs and fractal images) as more pleasant, whereas people who drew X-marks rated the 
same stimuli as less pleasant. These findings provided preliminary evidence that physical bodily 
actions play a critical role in determining people’s judgments.  
The results of study 1, however, raised the question of why people were influenced 
toward such decisions. Moreover, it would be relatively easy to influence attitudes toward novel 
stimuli, for which people would not have had pre-existing attitudes. Thus, in study 2, I used 
relatively familiar stimuli such as social policies and issues for which people might already have 
some attitudes; and I again examined whether bodily experienced marking actions could cue 
metaphoric concepts and then influence how people make judgments. The results of study 2 
suggested that people share beliefs about the marks; the check-mark, the X-mark, and the O-
mark (i.e., for a control group) were thought of as having a positive, a negative, and a neutral 
connotation, respectively. In addition, I found evidence that physical marking actions lead people 
to behave in ways that are consistent with the meanings of marks; people who drew positively 
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connoted check-marks were more likely to agree with assertions about divisive social policies 
and issues than those who drew negatively connoted X-marks or neutrally connoted O-marks on 
answers. Therefore, study 2, a stronger test of the hypothesis, demonstrated that differential 
marking behaviors could also affect people’s judgments on more familiar stimuli. 
In study 3, I further attempted to replicate study 2 with an additional set of experimental 
conditions to rule out the possibility that priming could account for my findings in studies 1 and 
2. Particularly, the priming manipulation took the form of an alternative instantiation of the 
marking action, viz. stamping the check or X-marks. People in stamping conditions moved their 
arms, and created, and saw the check and X-marks, but they did not actually draw the check and 
X-marks. Study 3 provided some support that the results from studies 1 and 2 were due to 
embodied manipulations of marking actions rather than priming effects. Again, people who drew 
check-marks agreed with statements about divisive social policies and issues significantly more 
than people who drew X-marks; however, people who stamped check-marks did not agree 
significantly more than people who stamped X-marks. These findings provided experimental 
evidence that embodied experiences of marking action lead to judgments consistent with the 
metaphoric meanings of such marking actions above and beyond the judgments influenced by 
arm movements that led to the creation of, and exposure to, check and X-marks (i.e., a priming 
manipulation). 
In study 4 I extended my previous findings to the context of consumer research and 
explored whether bodily experiences of marking affect people’s evaluative judgments of 
consumer products. The findings provided evidence for the role of the body in people’s affective 
reactions to different consumer products; people rated Folgers
®
 coffee flavors as more pleasant 
when answering with check-marks than X-marks. Study 4 also yielded an unexpected finding. I 
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initially assessed people’s general liking for coffee at the end of the experiment for the purpose 
of controlling for any unwanted effects that might result from their pre-existing preferences for 
coffee. I then found that there was no difference in terms of liking for coffee between the two 
experimental conditions. However, if physical marking actions guide how people make decisions, 
embodied influences derived from such physical and conceptual links should be observed in 
liking for coffee. I argue that this finding affords new insight into the dynamic nature of 
embodied cognition. Note that embodied influences of marking might not take long to “wear off,” 
though such embodied experiences play a direct role in encouraging people to make judgments 
and decisions.  
Finally, in study 5, drawing on research in choice architecture, I proposed a boundary 
condition in which people’s judgments are more or less likely to be influenced by their bodies – 
question framing. Here, question framing could be understood as ways in which questions are 
presented. I used two different ways of questioning: one was written in positive wording (e.g., 
how many flavors did you like?) and another was written in negative language (e.g., how many 
flavors didn’t you like?). I then found that bodily experiences of marking have a greater 
influence on judgments only when a given marking action and question framing denote a similar 
metaphoric concept. When people performed check-marking actions, they tended to choose more 
target items; therefore, question framing played a significant role in determining their judgments. 
For example, for the positively-framed question, making check-marks led to more likes and, for 
the negatively-framed question, the same marking behavior led to more dislikes. The opposite 
pattern occurred in the X-marking conditions. When people performed X-marking actions, they 
tended to choose fewer target items; so, for the positively-framed question, making X-marks led 
to fewer likes and, for the negatively-framed question, X-marking led to fewer dislikes.  
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Assuming the two responses, choosing fewer dislikes and choosing more likes, are 
interpretable in roughly the same way, the results of study 5 presented a novel explanation for 
the interaction between differential marking behaviors and question framing on subsequent 
choices. People who drew positively connoted check-marks chose more jelly bean flavors (Jelly 
Belly
®
) as likable only when exposed to a positively-presented question; people who drew 
negatively connoted X-marks selected more jelly bean flavors as likable only when exposed to a 
negatively-framed question. 
Like people’s general liking for coffee in study 4, near the end of study 5 I measured the 
perceived quality of jelly beans to limit any unwanted effects that might result from jelly bean 
assortments. There was no significant difference in terms of perceived quality of administered 
jelly beans. Thus, again, the findings provided experimental evidence for the time-variant nature 
of bodily experiences; physically experienced marking could not persist for very long time 
periods, rather such embodied influences likely wear off after a short period of time.  
Together, the current dissertation presents a foundational set of studies, which provide 
further support for the theoretical connections between metaphorically related physical and 
mental concepts. The results suggest that incidentally situated marking actions at the point of 
choice play a direct role in shaping our thoughts and subsequent judgments in ways that are 
consistent with such marking actions’ metaphoric meanings. None of these results were 
explained by individual differences such as gender or cultural background (i.e., U.S. citizens vs. 
non U.S. citizens). 
To further investigate whether the results of these dissertation studies are reliably 
consistent, I carried out a mini meta-analysis. The data from the first four studies were used to 
calculate the difference between the means: the means derived from the check-marking action 
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and the X-marking action
6
. Particularly, to corroborate whether participants’ judgments and 
decisions are guided by differential marking actions, I only included conditions derived from the 
two bodily interventions, drawing check-marks and X-marks. Thus, the O-marking condition 
from study 2 and the stamping condition from the study 3 were excluded when finding an overall 
best estimate of a confidence interval (see Table 1).  
 
Table 1.  
The mini meta-analysis: Characteristics of all included studies (n = 261) 
  Mx SDx Nx M SD N M - Mx Pooled SD t sig 
Study 1 3.32 0.63 39 3.75 0.51 39 0.43 0.57 3.31 p < .05 
Study 2 9.35 2.13 34 11.03 2.3 31 1.68 2.21 3.06 p < .05 
Study 3 9.25 1.92 20 10.86 1.8 21 1.61 1.86 2.77 p < .05 
Study 4 3.64 0.87 38 4.25 0.85 39 0.61 0.86 3.11 p < .05 
 
I used ESCI (Exploratory Software for Confidence Intervals) developed by Cumming 
(2012) to perform this meta-analysis (n = 261; 78 males, 183 females; Mage = 20.09, SDage = 
1.31). The calculated Q (i.e., a measure of the extent of heterogeneity in meta-analysis) was 8.49, 
which was much larger than df = 3. This result indicated that the studies in the meta-analysis 
were not homogeneous (p = .04). Thus, I preformed the meta-analysis using the random effects 
model rather than the fixed effect model (Cumming, 2012). 
                                                          
6
 The data from the study 5 were not included due to the difficulty of decomposing the logic of 
the double positive and the logic of double negative. 
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The meta-analysis suggested that differential marking behaviors affect participants’ 
judgments and decisions. The null hypothesis of no difference between the two marking 
conditions was rejected, p < .001, 95% random-effects confidence interval (CI) for the difference 
between the two experimental conditions = [.34, 1.26]. Thus, the cumulative evidence across the 
four dissertation studies was considered fairly consistent. As depicted in Figure 11 (see the meta-
analytic combination of the four results), physical marking actions indeed affected behavior, 
showing a positive mean difference between check-marking actions and X-marking actions. 
 
 
Figure 11. Forest plot indicating difference between the means and meta-analysis (n = 261) 
 
The empirical findings from the five dissertation studies add to the current literature in 
several ways. First of all, the present dissertation contributed to our understanding of the body-
mind link. As the mind controls the body, the body also controls the mind. This bidirectional 
connection drives people to process given choice-related information using (presumably implicit) 
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knowledge derived from the body. Drawn on the notion of embodiment to explicate the results, 
this dissertation demonstrates that performing two hand strokes at the point of choice, making 
check or X, can lead people to process and understand the same target information differently. 
To be specific, when people physically respond to questions with positively connoted check, 
such direct bodily experiences lead people to evaluate targets more favorably, to agree more with 
targeted issues, and to choose more targets. However, when people physically make negatively 
connoted X for answering the same questions, they tend to rate targets less favorably, to agree 
less with given issues, and to choose fewer targets. The two marking actions with check and X 
indeed differentially influence target information processing and subsequent judgments. 
Second, the findings provided novel evidence for the metaphorically related physical and 
conceptual link in a natural choice setting. This possibility has been investigated by previous 
literature. For instance, Wells and Petty (1980) suggested that moving one’s head up and down 
(nodding) signifies the abstract social concept of yes, whereas moving one’s head from side to 
side (shaking) implies the abstract social concept of no. They then found that nodders tended to 
agree more with a persuasive message than shakers. In addition, Cacioppo et al. (1993) proposed 
that moving something toward one’s body denotes the abstract concept of approach, while 
moving something away from one’s body represents the abstract concept of avoidance. They 
found that individuals who performed an approach-oriented action (i.e., placing one’s hands on 
the bottom of the desk, and then lifting it up) rated novel stimuli as more likable than those who 
performed an avoidance-oriented action (i.e., placing one’s hand on the top of the desk and then 
pressing it down).  
Though those physical actions could cue metaphorically related abstract social concepts 
such as the binaries of likes and dislikes or for and against, such manipulated bodily actions were 
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performed before individuals make their actual judgments about unrelated targets rather than at 
the point of choice. More critically, nodding or shaking one’s head and moving something 
toward or away from one’s body were devised for experimental manipulations in the laboratory, 
and thus such bodily actions were not usually seen in real-world situations in which people make 
judgments and decisions. Therefore, no empirical research has demonstrated yet whether bodily 
experiences at the point of choice would be reliably able to influence how people make choices, 
and more importantly, what is chosen. In this context, the findings in my dissertation studies can 
shed new light on the embodied influences of making choices. Bodily experiences of marking 
action at the point of choice can cue metaphorically related social concepts and, in turn, can 
influence how people think, feel, and behave. 
Third, the present dissertation can broaden the scope of bodily influences through 
marking action. The repeated bodily manipulations of marking when making choices (e.g., 
drawing check-marks) and the use of various decision contexts (e.g., ratings of novel stimuli, 
judgments of social policies and issues, affective reactions to stimuli) afforded evidence that a 
wide range of targets can be metaphorically mapped onto the same source. To be specific, direct 
bodily experiences of checks and X-marks can be used to capture a wide range of abstract social 
concepts such as the binaries of likes and dislikes (e.g., pleasant and unpleasant), right and 
wrong (e.g., correct and incorrect), and for and against (e.g., agree and disagree). This suggested 
that people might have the ability to selectively use one of the abstract target concepts derived 
from a metaphorically related direct source concept.  
As noted earlier, to understand abstract social concepts or any accompanying experiences, 
people commonly rub the magic lamp and release the genie, that is, metaphor. Metaphors 
pervade across situations, and thus, the same target can be metaphorically associated with 
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diverse sources (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Landau et al., 2010). For example, love can be 
frequently mapped onto the metaphorically related concept of journey; thus people typically use 
expressions based on such metaphoric association like “I don't think this relationship is going 
anywhere.” Love can be also metaphorically linked to the seemingly different concept of war. 
People use metaphoric expressions such as “she conquered my heart.” In this context, 
researchers addressed that alternative conceptual mappings can be possible depending on given 
contexts; and more importantly, they argued that such possibility makes people show 
metaphorically consistent changes. In particular, mapping an abstract target concept A (e.g., 
intimacy) onto one concrete source B (e.g., physical warmth) leads people to understand some 
elements derived from the conceptual A and physical B link, while mapping that same target 
concept A (e.g., intimacy) onto an alternative concrete source C (e.g., physical closeness) makes 
people construe a different set of elements stemming from the association between 
metaphorically related abstract concept A and physical concept C.  
In contrast, the current finding suggested the different abstract target concepts can be also 
understood through the same concrete source that are directly experienced by the body. Indeed, I 
found that physically experiencing the source (i.e., check and X-marks) makes people draw on 
their knowledge as a reference to understand a wide range of abstract concepts (i.e., the binaries 
of likes and dislikes, right and wrong, and for and against). However, to what use can this insight 
be put? I argue that the findings can be uniquely applied to diverse decision contexts such as 
public opinion polling and prosocial campaigns that aim to change people’s attitudes or 
behavioral intentions (e.g., donation to charity). Regardless of the domains, I expect that bodily 
experiences of check and X-mark at the point of choice can cue metaphorically related social 
concepts such as the binaries of likes and dislikes, right and wrong, and for and against; such 
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activated concepts furthermore influence the way people think about their decision contexts and, 
in turn, shape their ultimate judgments and decisions.  
However, this dissertation could not provide data to determine what physical concepts 
shaped psychological meanings of the two marking actions. I speculate that differential marking 
actions end with opposite directionality of hand-movement; for most people, drawing check-
marks ends with an upward strike while drawing X-marks ends with a downward strike. Given 
that the opposite directionality of movement (e.g., up and down) makes people process 
metaphorically associated concepts (e.g., good is up, bad is down, Lakoff & Johnson, 1980), it 
might be that the way people write check and X directly cues metaphorically related meanings of 
marking actions and affects people’s thoughts and judgments.     
Fourth, in the present dissertation I found that embodied influences cannot persist for 
very long time periods. This is, to my knowledge, the first empirical demonstration of the 
dynamic nature of embodied cognition. In particular, the results from studies 4 and 5 suggested 
that the effect of physically experienced marking actions likely wears off after a short period of 
time. Researchers have primarily focused on possible embodied influences. Since the earliest 
empirical research on embodied cognition, it has been shown that bodily experiences reliably 
lead people to reenact a mental comprehension of metaphorically related abstract concepts; 
moreover it has been also illustrated that such physical experiences make people come to 
understand their thoughts about abstract social concepts and subsequently affect their judgments 
(Barsalou, 1999, 2008; Landau et al., 2010; Niedenthal et al., 2005; Reimann et al., 2012). 
However, an obvious question remains unanswered: how long do embodied influences last? One 
possibility involves the time-variant nature of bodily experiences. Abstract social concepts can 
be understood by body-based cognitive processes in a metaphoric manner. Such bodily 
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influences on information processing, however, cannot persist for a long time in the absence of 
further embodied experiences. The body’s homeostatic mechanisms might explain the 
aforementioned dynamic nature of embodied cognition. As seen in the power posing study 
earlier (Carney et al., 2010), bodily actions (e.g., making high-power poses) not only influence 
people’s feelings and behaviors (e.g., feelings of power, tolerance for a risky choice) but also 
lead to neuroendocrine changes (e.g., testosterone, cortisol). In order to effectively respond to 
any changes in external environments, all homeostatic mechanisms in one’s body make efforts to 
maintain a constant or a normal state of the body through primarily neuroendocrine changes 
(McCall, & Singer, 2012). In this context, I speculate that the homeostatic regulation systems 
almost certainly attempt to maintain the stability of one’s body by sending signals to muscles or 
organs when people have completed given physical actions; thus, such self-control or self-
regulating mechanisms might cause embodied influences to soon disappear. Thus, drawing on a 
biological account, namely homeostasis, the current dissertation would contribute to the 
literature by identifying this dynamic nature of embodied cognition.  
Last, previous research has mainly focused on the physical and conceptual link by 
examining “whether metaphor operates at a conceptual level to influence information processing” 
(Landau et al., 2010, p. 1058). This metaphor-focused approach has yielded empirical evidence 
of numerous associations between metaphorically related physical and psychological concepts 
(Bargh et al., 2012; Landau et al., 2010). This dissertation, however, extended the metaphor-
oriented perspective by identifying a possible boundary condition that limits bodily experiences 
of marking on people’s subsequent judgments. In other words, I adopted a phenomenon-based 
approach (Bargh et al., 2012; Landau et al., 2010) and proposed another determinant, question 
framing, which was expected to interact with physical experiences of choice. Indeed, question 
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framing, the way a question is framed either in a positive (i.e., written in positive language) or a 
negative way (i.e., written in a negative language) plays a role in determining embodied 
influences; bodily experiences of marking exerted a stronger influence on people’s judgments 
when the metaphoric concepts residing in marking actions and question frames were consistent 
or matched. Therefore, the results in study 5 shed new light on the role of framing in embodied 
influences at the point of choice and also contributed to research on decision making.  
The findings of my dissertation afford theoretical and practical insight into the ways in 
which people’s bodily experiences at the point of choice affect their thoughts, feelings, and 
behaviors. However, several limitations should be noted, which could be addressed by future 
research. First, I adopted controversial social policies and issues based on the Gallup
®
 poll social 
series, because such values and beliefs are expected to divide Americans the most. Particularly, I 
asked participants in studies 2 and 3 to indicate their opinions on 20 divisive social policies and 
issues in a dichotomous manner by either agreeing or disagreeing. However, I didn’t empirically 
test whether participants in both studies (e.g., undergraduate students aged 19-25 years) have 
pre-existing beliefs about such social policies and issues; thus, it was unknown how many of 
them have opinions on these issues, or what direction their opinions lean, or how strong those 
opinions might be. In an extreme case, one might argue that findings from studies 2 and 3 might 
be entirely due to participants’ tendencies to agree more with policies or issues for which they 
have no pre-existing opinions at all. As noted before, the current results from studies 2 and 3 did 
not imply that bodily experiences of marking dramatically sway all people’s beliefs toward 
social issues; it suggested that such physical experiences of check and X-mark affect at least 
some people’s tendency to agree with or otherwise respond to controversial social issues. 
Although my findings provided evidence that bodily experiences of marking make people think 
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about divisive social policies and issues in ways that are consistent with the meanings of marks, 
further investigation is needed to explore whether embodied influences can change people’s 
biased thoughts or pre-existing attitudes about something in predictable ways. 
Second, it is also important to note that the priming effect in study 3 was not completely 
zero. Though it was not significant, people who stamped check-marks (M = 10.16, SD = 2.12) 
agreed more with assertions about divisive social policies and issues than those who stamped X-
marks (M = 10.05, SD = 1.90). In addition, there also exists another possibility that bodily 
experiences of stamping might wipe out the prime. For example, though the two manipulated 
ways of marking (i.e., for embodiment: drawing check or X-marks, for priming: stamping check 
or X-marks) make people engage in similar hand movements, people in the stamping condition 
performed the same physical actions such as pressing a given stamp to the inkpad and applying it 
when making choices. However, people in the drawing condition had to perform two seemingly 
different physical actions. It might be possible that the sameness of the stamping action would 
eclipse the check and X primes. Future research therefore needs to use another way to prime 
people with the check and X-mark and to examine whether people’s judgments derived from the 
current bodily manipulations are above and beyond the judgments guided by priming. 
Third, there is a possibility that the present results in study 3 would reflect another form 
of priming. Like priming, bodily experiences with check and X-mark make people interpret and 
understand some concepts without their conscious awareness. Moreover, increased concept 
accessibility through the body-based metaphor seems a likely mechanism of such embodied 
effects. Although I found that the body can control the mind by cueing metaphorically related 
concepts, this dissertation could not address whether embodied effects in human cognition would 
be considered as a strong instance of priming effect. There were no data on the qualitative 
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differences between two seemingly similar mechanisms: embodied cognition and conceptual 
priming. More specific physical concepts should be examined to effectively disentangle any 
priming effects (or explanations) from embodied experiences at the point of choice.  
Last, my attempt to interpret choosing fewer dislikes as another synonymous expression, 
choosing more likes, helped understand the key findings of study 5 more intuitively. However, 
choosing fewer dislikes might not always be translated into choosing more likes, because people 
might feel indifferent when making their choice responses. Thus, future studies would benefit 
from further investigating the impacts of qualitatively different types of question framing on 
subsequent judgments. 
The results from this dissertation have important practical implications. As noted earlier, 
the present findings might be uniquely applied to various decision situations such as public 
opinion polling or consumer choice contexts. For example, differential marking behaviors 
physically experienced during shopping could influence how people choose. Imagine a 
hypothetical shopping situation: people walk into the mall, and they encounter a salesperson 
passing out a promotional flyer, a map with a shopping list of advertised products, and a pencil. 
The salesperson might ask people to draw check-marks on their preferred items in a list of 
advertised products. What would be benefits from this strategy? I expect that when the choice is 
driven by bodily experienced check marking actions, people would choose more items (or at 
least evaluate advertised products as likable). In other words, physical experiences of check-
marking could be designed to alter the atmosphere of the decision situation and ultimately to 
steer people’s subsequent choice behaviors; thus, marketers could benefit from this embodied 
strategy.  
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We, human beings, experience and understand the world through our bodies. Human 
cognition is grounded within our bodies or bodily experiences. Overall, the present dissertation 
confirms the metaphorically related physical and conceptual link in the context of consumer 
research and highlights the role of body-based metaphors in the processing of information. How 
people think and how they make judgments are profoundly guided by incidental bodily 
experiences at the point of choice; thus, it might be interesting for people to stay awake and keep 
listening to what their bodies say.  
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A: Experimental materials from Study 1 – Chinese pictographs (Payne et al., 2005) 
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Appendix B: Experimental materials from Study 1 – Fractal images (Payne et al., 2014) 
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Appendix C: Experimental materials from Studies 2 and 3, Social policies and issues  
 
Social policies and issues 
 
 
Supporting doctor assisted suicide 
 
 
Legalized the death penalty 
Legalized gay or lesbian relations 
 
Divorce 
Legalized abortion 
 
Suicide 
Having a baby outside of marriage 
 
Cloning humans 
Sex between an unmarried man and woman 
 
Polygamy 
Buying and wearing clothing made of animal 
fur 
 
Married men and women having an affair 
Medical testing on animals 
 
Banning handgun ownership 
Gambling 
 
Legalized marijuana 
Medical research using stem cells obtained 
from human embryos 
 
Increasing national defense spending 
Cloning animals 
 
Supporting legal status for immigrants 
 
Note. The 20 divisive social policies and issues were selected based on the results of Gallup
®
 
Poll Series 2010-2014, because such policies and issues were expected to divide Americans the 
most. The results were derived from telephone interviews with a random sample of more than a 
thousand adults, aged 18 or above, living in all 50 U.S. states and the District of Columbia 
((http://www.gallup.com/topic/americas.aspx).  
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Appendix D: Experimental materials from Study 4, Folgers K-Cup
® 
 
 
 
French roast 
 
 
Hazelnut Cream 
 
Vanilla Biscotti 
 
Black silk 
 
 
Mocha Swirl 
 
Morning Café 
 
Lively Columbian 
 
 
Classic Roast 
 
Caramel Drizzle 
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Appendix E:  Experimental materials from Study 5, Jelly Belly
®
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